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Shining Light on Global Supply Chains
Galit A. Sarfaty*
This Article analyzes the effectiveness of emerging domestic legislation on global supply chain transparency
with respect to human rights and labor practices.  It draws from a quantitative and qualitative study of
the implementation of recent U.S. conflict minerals legislation, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Financial
Reform Act, which is driving global norms in this area and serving as a guide for comparable domestic
legislation abroad. This Article’s analysis of section 1502 reveals a due diligence gap among firms, with
only about 7% of companies reporting strong due diligence measures in their 2014 Conflict Minerals
Reports. This Article also identifies several factors that are inhibiting implementation of section 1502: (i)
international norms on supply chain due diligence are in their infancy; (ii) the proliferation of certifica-
tion standards and in-region sourcing initiatives are still evolving and often competing; and (iii) inade-
quate local security and weak governance are inhibiting the mapping of the mineral trade and the tracing
of minerals in the region. While this Article argues that using domestic law to regulate global supply
chains has the potential to significantly shape corporate behavior, the existing due diligence gap suggests
that the shift to domestic governance is not going far enough. Given the challenges associated with extra-
territorially regulating complex, multi-tiered supply chains, home states need to play a larger role in
implementation to facilitate corporate compliance. In addition, companies need to invest in their internal
culture to facilitate organizational learning around responsible supply chain management.
Introduction
Recent tragedies—including the collapse of a garment factory building in
Bangladesh killing more than 1,000 people and a string of suicides at an
Apple supplier’s manufacturing plant in China—have highlighted the risks
of outsourcing production to suppliers with poor working conditions.1 Until
recently, whether a company prevents human rights violations in its supply
chain has largely been left to the company itself.2 While consumer and in-
* Assistant Professor and Canada Research Chair in Global Economic Governance, Faculty of Law,
University of British Columbia. A.B., Harvard College, 2000; J.D., Yale Law School, 2005; Ph.D.,
Anthropology, University of Chicago, 2011. I am grateful to Joel Bakan, Cristie Ford, Adam Saunders,
James Stewart, and the editors of the Harvard International Law Journal for their assistance and helpful
comments. I also thank Shawn Erker and Hamish Stewart for their outstanding research assistance. The
Allard Prize Research and Scholarship Fund Grant provided generous support to carry out this research.
1. See Jim Yardley, Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds Widespread Blame, N.Y. Times
(May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-bangladesh-building-col
lapse-finds-widespread-blame.html; David Barboza, After Suicides, Scrutiny of China’s Grim Factories, N.Y.
Times (June 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/business/global/07suicide.html?pagewanted
=all.
2. See generally Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-
Regulation in a Global Economy (2001); Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effec-
tive Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 931
(2004); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J.
443, 526–30 (2001); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,
101 Am. J. Int’l L. 819 (2007).
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vestor pressure has led some companies to prioritize responsible sourcing,
the standards in this area have remained mostly voluntary. The lack of
mandatory regulation has led to inconsistent practice among firms, stan-
dards that are implemented in an ad hoc fashion, and weak incentives for
changing behavior.3
Governments are now demanding more information on the origins of a
company’s products. In the United States, for instance, an ever-growing
body of federal and state regulations reflects the growing trend toward sup-
ply chain transparency. While existing legislation has addressed such issues
as anti-corruption (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and wildlife protection
(Lacey Act), new laws mandate disclosure on human rights-related risks in
global supply chains such as the use of conflict minerals (section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act) and human trafficking (California Trans-
parency in Supply Chains Act).4 Supply chain-related laws represent a shift
in international regulation from the prevailing model of “transnational new
governance,” which is dependent on voluntary standards by private actors
and international institutions, toward the use of domestic law.5 This shift is
particularly notable with regard to the field of business and human rights,
which has traditionally operated through international soft law.6 Domestic
supply chain-related regulation is an avenue by which home states can po-
tentially set environmental and human rights-related norms for third-party
suppliers and their host governments via multinational companies. These
regulations not only affect companies; they also serve as an alternative to
international law for shaping the behavior of host governments. Under pres-
sure from third-party suppliers, developing countries may pass legislation
and strengthen their rule of law in order to prevent global companies from
shifting their supply chains to other regions.7
3. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International
Human Rights Violations?, 40 Williamette L. Rev. 103 (2004); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 2, at
952–58; Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 635 (2004).
4. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012); Lacey Act of 1990, 16
U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012)) [here-
inafter Dodd-Frank Act § 1502]; California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012).
5. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational
New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 501, 541 (2009); see also
John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000); Burkard Eberlein et
al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 Reg. &
Governance 1 (2014).
6. These soft law instruments include the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
U.N. Global Compact, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and Global Reporting Initiative.
One exception is the Alien Tort Statute, but the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited its extraterritorial
application. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
7. See e.g., Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global
Supply Chains, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 711, 737–41 (2009).
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This Article analyzes the effectiveness of using domestic law to regulate
global supply chains with respect to human rights and labor practices.
While the financial and strategic benefits of outsourcing are commonly ac-
knowledged,8 the governance of global supply chains has been understudied
in existing literature.9  Given that transnational corporate activity is now
anchored in the activities of third-party suppliers abroad, legal scholars need
to focus on this increasingly relevant area. This Article aims to inspire re-
search in this field through an empirical analysis of recent conflict minerals
legislation in the United States. The U.S. law is driving global norms in this
area and serving as a guide for comparable domestic legislation on supply
chain transparency.10
Domestic regulations on supply chains pose a unique compliance chal-
lenge to companies because these laws operate extraterritorially. Multina-
tional companies are more than just regulated entities; they now also serve
as regulators themselves, imposing standards on their third-party suppliers
in other countries. Thus, regulation about outsourcing is itself being out-
sourced to companies, which are responsible for ensuring compliance by the
firms within their multi-tiered supply chains. This model of outsourcing
stands in contrast to examples in existing literature on the privatization of
public law and the development of “public-private governance.”11 Scholars
have focused on the outsourcing of regulation to non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), auditors, and other third parties that take on standard-
setting, implementation, and enforcement functions traditionally occupied
by regulatory agencies.12 Yet supply chain regulation exemplifies a distinct
model of outsourcing that dilutes the host state’s governing authority.
While outsourcing regulation to companies is a means by which states
can indirectly regulate firms in other countries, this practice raises accounta-
bility concerns when private actors are performing functions that are funda-
mentally public.13  Like other forms of public-private governance, there are
risks to public values when private actors perform functions conventionally
8. See Diana Farrell et al., McKinsey Global Institute, Offshoring: Is it a Win-Win
Game? 1–9 (2003).
9. For a few recent exceptions in the legal literature, see Lin, supra note 7; Kishanthi Parella, Outsourc-
ing Corporate Accountability, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 747 (2014); Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of
Public Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 101 (2007). For a comprehensive analysis of supply chain literature in
multiple disciplines, see Kevin Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 5 Transnat’l
Legal Theory 3 (2014).
10. See infra section II.A.
11. See generally Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. Rev.
1687 (2002); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1211 (2003); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (2000); Sidney A. Shapiro, Out-
sourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389 (2003); Vandenbergh, supra note 9.
12. See New Forms of Governance, supra note 11; Public Values in an Era of Privatization, supra note 11;
Freeman, supra note 11; Shapiro, supra note 11; Vandenbergh, supra note 11; see also Lesley K. McAllister,
Regulation by Third Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2012); Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation:
Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 Pol’y Stud. J. 1 (2003).
13. See McAllister, supra note 12, at 31–37.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 4 21-AUG-15 12:04
422 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
reserved for government agencies.14 Supply chain laws pose a greater risk to
accountability given that the regulated entities themselves are sometimes
ill-equipped to monitor and enforce compliance by third parties. Companies
may then outsource compliance to private parties such as consulting firms or
suppliers who audit the tiers of suppliers below them. A chain of outsourc-
ing has thus developed, one involving layers of monitoring and enforcement,
and often competing systems of incentives.
This Article’s analysis of domestic laws regulating global supply chains
draws from an empirical study of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and
its early implementation. Section 1502 imposes a new reporting require-
ment on publicly traded companies that manufacture products using certain
conflict minerals.15 The stated rationale behind the law is that by curbing
the illegitimate exploitation of natural resources by state and non-state
armed groups, it will indirectly hinder financing of the ongoing conflicts in
the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under section 1502,
companies must report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on whether the sourcing of the minerals originated in the DRC and
bordering countries. If so, the companies must submit a Conflict Minerals
Report on due diligence measures taken to determine whether those conflict
minerals directly or indirectly financed or benefited armed groups in the
covered countries.16 The quality of the due diligence must meet nationally
or internationally recognized standards, such as the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-
Risk Areas.17 This empirical analysis examines compliance with section
1502 by reviewing corporate disclosures on their due diligence measures. It
does not address the legislation’s impact on the local population, including
whether it is achieving its aim of curbing the violent conflict in the DRC.18
14. See New Forms of Governance, supra note 11; Public Values in an Era of Privatization, supra note 11;
Freeman, supra note 11; Shapiro, supra note 11; Vandenbergh, supra note 11.
15. Dodd-Frank Act § 1502.
16. Id.
17. OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Af-
fected and High-Risk Areas (2d ed. 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264185050-en [hereinafter
OECD Due Diligence Guidance]; see also Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56281–82.
18. The local impact of section 1502 is still unclear given that the legislation is only in the early years
of implementation. Some critics have pointed to unintended consequences, including an embargo of the
region soon after the legislation was passed. See Christiana Ochoa & Patrick Keenan, Regulating Informa-
tion Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 Goettingen J.
Int’l L. 129 (2011); Dominic Johnson, The Misguided Struggle Against “Conflict Minerals” in the DRC,
Pole Institute (May 14, 2013), http://goodelectronics.org/news-en/new-report-from-pole-institute-
about-conflict-minerals-from-congo; see also Amy Tsui, Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Rule Said Tantamount
to Embargo on D.R. Congo, Sec. Reg. & Law Report (BNA) No. 43, at 916 (May 2, 2011). For a discussion
of section 1502’s positive effects on mining sector reform and local mining communities in the DRC, see
The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-Frank’s Conflict Minerals Provision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mone-
tary Pol’y & Trade of the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 113th Cong. 12-13, 60-63 (2013) (statement of Sophia
Pickles, Global Witness), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/113-23.pdf.
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Based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of section 1502, this Arti-
cle argues that using domestic law to regulate global supply chains has sig-
nificant potential to shape corporate behavior. But the existing due
diligence gap suggests that the shift to domestic governance is not going far
enough. Given the challenges associated with extraterritorially regulating
complex, multi-tiered supply chains, home states need to play a larger role
in implementation to facilitate corporate compliance.
My study of section 1502 reveals a due diligence gap among firms, with
only about 7% of companies reporting strong due diligence measures in
their 2014 Conflict Minerals Reports. I present several explanatory variables
for this due diligence gap including brand, firm size, and involvement with
stakeholder-led responsible sourcing initiatives. I then identify three factors
that are inhibiting implementation of section 1502: (i) international norms
on supply chain due diligence are in their infancy; (ii) the proliferation of
certification standards and in-region sourcing initiatives are still evolving
and often competing; and (iii) inadequate local security and weak govern-
ance are inhibiting the mapping of the mineral trade and the tracing of
minerals in the region. In order to improve corporate compliance, home
countries need to play a larger role in implementation by investing in local
capacity building, coordinating in-region sourcing initiatives and certifica-
tion standards, and supporting companies still struggling with compliance.
In addition, companies need to invest in a culture of compliance led by an
interdisciplinary team of employees from multiple departments and featur-
ing organizational learning around supply chain management. In the process
of complying with these laws and conducting due diligence, companies can
find possible inefficiencies within their supply chains and thereby improve
their supply chain management so as to effectively reduce costs.
This Article’s findings are based on an analysis of the first set of Conflict
Minerals Reports submitted to the SEC by early June 2014. This quantita-
tive study is the first of its kind in the literature and represents a significant
contribution to our understanding of how companies are implementing sec-
tion 1502.19 In this study, this Article creates a model for determining
which companies have undertaken the most comprehensive supply chain due
diligence in line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and which com-
panies have inadequately or only minimally complied with the legislation.
In order to understand the reasons for under-implementation, this Article
relies on ethnographic interviews with 25 people within consultancies, in-
dustry groups, non-governmental organizations, and law firms who are
working with companies to comply with the legislation. The interviewees
were selected from within organizations that have been very active in the
19. Given that only one set of Conflict Minerals Reports was available when I conducted my analysis,
a longitudinal study was unfortunately not possible.
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early implementation of section 1502,20 using a “snowball sample” ap-
proach to identify potential interviewees.21  Interviews were unstructured or
semi-structured with open-ended questions developed in response to obser-
vations and ongoing analysis.22 In addition, this Article draws from partici-
pant observation within a consulting firm based in London that conducts
conflict minerals due diligence and auditing and at international conferences
on responsible supply chain management (e.g., meetings hosted by the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the OECD).
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the growing body of do-
mestic regulations on global supply chain transparency and the distinct
model of outsourcing reflected in these laws. It demonstrates why these reg-
ulations are particularly difficult to implement given the multi-tiered and
fluid nature of global supply chains. Part II presents empirical evidence
based on this Article’s study of section 1502. After analyzing data on due
diligence levels, it discusses challenges to implementation that explain dif-
ferentiation among companies. Given the distinct challenges posed by sup-
ply chain regulations, Part III offers recommendations to close the due
diligence gap by affording a greater role to home states in implementation.
It also demonstrates how companies can improve compliance by investing in
their internal culture.
I. The Governance of Global Supply Chains
The growing body of law on supply chain transparency reflects an in-
creased recognition of human rights, labor rights, and environmental viola-
tions by third-party suppliers. As multinational companies are becoming
more dependent on global outsourcing, there is a need for regulation to
ensure responsible supply chains. Calls for regulation are part of a larger
movement to hold corporations liable for adverse human rights practices in
their operations. U.S. supply chain-related laws are beginning to reflect that
priority. While these laws have typically addressed such social concerns as
anti-corruption, food and product safety, and wildlife protection, recent leg-
islation addresses the use of forced and child labor, human trafficking, and
conflict minerals in global supply chains. However, these laws are particu-
larly difficult to implement given the multi-tiered and fluid nature of sup-
ply chains. As we see in the case of section 1502, supply chain regulation has
adopted a distinct model of outsourcing to manage this complexity whereby
20. Given that section 1502 only recently passed and survived court challenges, there is a relatively
small network of organizations that have been active in its early implementation.
21. See Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral
Sampling, 10 Soc. Methods & Res. 141, 141 (1981) (“Snowball . . . sampling is a method that . . .
yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess
some characteristics that are of research interest.”)
22. The questions were designed to seek respondents’ interpretations of the legislation and allow them
to describe problems, policy solutions, and their rationales in their own words.
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regulation is outsourced to the regulated parties themselves. This practice
creates a new role for companies as regulators of their suppliers and has
significant implications for public accountability.
A. The Need for Regulation
Global outsourcing—the practice of sub-contracting business to third
parties in other countries—has become a trillion-dollar industry,23 with an
annual growth rate between 12% and 26% across functions.24 According to
Peter Drucker, whom many consider the father of modern management the-
ory, outsourcing is “one of the greatest organizational and industry structure
shifts of the century.”25 Princeton economist Alan Blinder has even sug-
gested that it could comprise a “third industrial revolution.”26 The govern-
ance of global supply chains is therefore a ripe area of study for legal
scholars.
The need to regulate outsourcing is most evident when investigating
human rights abuses by multinational corporations. Such violations fre-
quently occur within global supply chains, where host countries have weak
legal institutions and home states are unable to extraterritorially regulate
third party suppliers.27 These abuses range from corporate complicity in la-
bor rights violations to indirect support of corrupt or oppressive regimes.
They can occur at any level of a supply chain, from the first tier of direct
suppliers to layers of sub-contractors to the firms providing raw material
inputs.28 While outsourcing has transformed the way that companies miti-
gate costs and make profits, it has also increased the legal responsibility of
firms to track compliance by their suppliers and highlighted the importance
of ensuring responsible and transparent supply chains.29
There is a critical need to regulate corporate management of third-party
suppliers, particularly with respect to their human rights and labor prac-
23. In 2001, worldwide spending on global outsourcing, sometimes referred to as “offshore outsourc-
ing,” was estimated to be $3.7 trillion. Christopher B. Clott, Perspectives on Global Outsourcing and the
Changing Nature of Work, 109 Bus. & Soc’y Rev. 153, 153 (2004).
24. Deloitte, Deloitte’s 2014 Global Outsourcing and Insourcing Survey 14 (2014),
available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/strategy/us-2014-global-out
sourcing-insourcing-survey-report-123114.pdf.
25. Peter Drucker, Peter Drucker on the Profession of Management (1998), quoted in
Clott, supra note 23, at 153.
26. See Alan S. Blinder, Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?, Foreign Aff. (Mar./Apr. 2006),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61514/alan-s-blinder/offshoring-the-next-industrial-
revolution.
27. See OECD, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in Supply Chains, 10th OECD
Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility Discussion Paper (June 30, 2010), available at http://
www.oecd.org/investment/mne/45535896.pdf.
28. See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 339 (2001).
29. See, e.g., Barchi Gillai et al., Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus., The Relationship Between
Responsible Supply Chain Practices and Performance: Research Insights (2013); Sarah
Labowitz & Dorothe´e Baumann-Pauly, NYU Stern Sch. of Bus., Business As Usual Is Not an
Option: Supply Chains and Sourcing after Rana Plaza (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 8 21-AUG-15 12:04
426 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
tices. Regulations addressing responsible supply chains do not only affect
multinational companies and firms to which they outsource; they also serve
as an alternative to international law for shaping the behavior of host gov-
ernments. Under pressure from third-party suppliers, developing countries
may pass legislation and strengthen their rule of law in order to prevent
global companies from shifting their supply chains to other countries.
While development agencies lend money directly to governments in an ef-
fort to curb poverty, multinational companies can arguably have a more
immediate effect on the local region through their supply chains. Thus, sup-
ply chain regulation is an avenue by which home states can transmit human
rights norms to third-party suppliers and their host governments via mul-
tinational companies.
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights has been endorsed
by scholars and policymakers,30 most notably John Ruggie, the former UN
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights.31 The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which Ruggie developed, state
that companies are expected to “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or ser-
vices by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to
those impacts.”32 Business relationships are understood to include relation-
ships with “entities in [a company’s] value chain.”33 While the UN Human
Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles, they are still
considered soft law and have yet to translate into mandatory regulation.
Other existing voluntary standards (e.g., OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and UN Global Compact)34 and
self-regulation (e.g., codes of conduct) have been largely ineffective in shap-
30. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006); Jose´
E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 1 (2011); David
Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at
International Law, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 931 (2004); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443 (2001); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights:
The Evolving International Agenda, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 819 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Trans-
national Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Human Rights, Report of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie)
[hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles].
32. Id. at Principle 13(b).
33. Id. at Principle 13(b) cmt.
34. See OECD, The OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications,
DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL (Oct. 31, 2001); International Labor Organization, Tripartite Decla-
ration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, (4th ed. 2006), available at http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_09
4386.pdf. For a comprehensive analysis of existing voluntary instruments and their references to supply
chain issues, see Radu Mares, The Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility: A Critical Analysis of CSR Instru-
ments, 79 Nordic J. Int’l L. 193 (2010).
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ing corporate behavior as they lack independent monitoring and enforce-
ment mechanisms and are thus subject to critiques of greenwashing.35 Yet
domestic law is emerging as a promising avenue to regulate human rights
practices within global supply chains.
B. The Emergence of Domestic Supply Chain-Related Laws
A growing body of domestic law affects corporate supply chains on such
issues as wildlife protection, food and product safety, anti-corruption,
human trafficking, and conflict minerals. This section focuses on U.S. laws
that address social and safety concerns with regard to promoting responsible
and transparent supply chains. Until recently, supply chains have not been
the direct target of regulation, but they are nonetheless implicated in a
number of existing regulations. These laws serve as a model for future sup-
ply chain regulations that can be passed on the domestic level. They include
“restrictions of certain imports or sales to the government; certification, in-
spection and monitoring requirements; and/or requirements to publicly dis-
close compliance with the above on company websites or financial
statements.”36
In the area of anti-corruption, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
has transformed corporate compliance systems, including with respect to
global supply chains.37 The FCPA extends the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to
enforce bribery charges extraterritorially. Most notably, it attaches liability
to a company through its supply chain vendors. According to a resource
guide released by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2012, liability under
the FCPA only requires that a company is aware of “a high probability” of
misconduct even if it does not possess actual knowledge of the offense.38 The
guide recommends that companies perform risk-based due diligence of third
parties, “including agents, consultants, and distributors,” who may directly
or indirectly seek to bribe foreign public officials.39 Because of the high
penalties attached to violations under the FCPA, this law has spurred com-
panies to develop compliance policies and enforce contractual provisions on
their third-party suppliers.40
35. See William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. Bus. Ethics 253
(2003); Penelope Simons, Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of Volun-
tary Self-Regulation Regimes, Rel. Industrielles 101 (Jan. 1, 2004).
36. Paul C. Rosenthal & Benjamin Blase Caryl, Socially Responsible Supply Chain Compliance, 20.5 Met-
ropolitan Corp. Couns. (Metropolitan Corp. Counsel, Mountainside, NJ), May 2012, at 10.
37. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 Ga. L. Rev.
489, 495, 574–77 (2010-2011).
38. U.S. Dept. of Justice, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 22
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/
guide.pdf.
39. Id. at 60.
40. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard, HP Partner Code of Conduct (2012), available at http://welcome.hp.com/
country/us/en/solutions/Partner_Code_of_Conduct_21Apr09.pdf.
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Companies also face regulatory requirements affecting their supply chains
with regard to wildlife protection and food and product safety. Enacted in
1900, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful to import, export, sell, acquire, or
purchase protected wildlife, fish, and plants.41 Congress amended the act in
2008 to include more plants and plant products, including illegally logged
timber.42 The Act places the burden on American manufacturers to ensure
that wood imports are legal.43 In order to minimize the risk of illegal wood
entering supply chains, firms must implement due diligence systems on
their suppliers.44 Similarly, food companies are evaluating their supply chain
in response to the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010, which requires
importers to complete a risk-based foreign supplier verification to confirm
that the food products that they bring into the United States are safe.45
Other supply chain-related regulations include the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act, under which all parties in the supply chain of children’s
products must provide a certificate of conformity to show compliance with
safety and testing rules, as well as product labeling laws, such as the Fur
Products Labeling Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and
the Wool Products Labeling Act.46 These laws require all fur, textile, and
wool products sold in the United States to have a label disclosing the fiber/
fur content, country of origin, and the manufacturer, importer, distributor,
or seller.47
U.S. lawmakers have also been quite active in regulating the use of forced
labor, child labor, and human trafficking in global supply chains. As early as
1930, Congress prohibited importation of products made with forced labor
or convict labor, under section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.48 For-
mer President Clinton reinforced and expanded the law in 1999 through
Executive Order 13126, which prohibits federal agencies from buying prod-
ucts made by child labor.49 Since then, the body of law targeting forced/
child labor and human trafficking in supply chains has grown tremendously.
Certain laws focus specifically on human rights violations in Burma. For
instance, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic
Efforts) Act outlaws the importation of Burmese-origin rubies and jade into
the United States and requires a verifiable system of supply chain over-
41. Lacey Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2006).
42. Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat. 1651,
2052–56.
43. Id. at 2054.
44. Id.
45. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
46. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2089 (2012); Fur Products La-
beling Act of 1952, 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1951); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70
(1960); Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1939).
47. Id.
48. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930). Note that the
act includes broad exceptions, such as allowing the importation of goods produced with forced labor if
there is greater consumer demand for that product than the existing quantity in the United States.
49. See Exec. Order No. 13,126, 3 C.F.R. 195 (2000).
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sight.50 In 2013, the U.S. State Department adopted the Burma Responsible
Investment Reporting Requirements, which require any U.S. persons whose
aggregate investment in Burma exceeds $500,000 to submit an annual re-
port on their investment.51 Reports must include due diligence policies and
procedures that address impacts on human rights, worker rights, and the
environment.52
Recent anti-human trafficking laws that target the corporate supply chain
impose significant regulatory requirements on firms. Under the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, U.S. government contractors, subcontrac-
tors, and their employees are prohibited from engaging in trafficking in
persons or using forced labor in the performance of a U.S. government con-
tract or subcontract.53 President Obama’s Executive Order 13627, Strength-
ening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts,
reinforces and adds to this legislation.54 The 2012 order prohibits federal
contractors and subcontractors from engaging in trafficking-related activi-
ties and requires that they contractually agree to allow for anti-trafficking
compliance audits and investigations.55 President Obama also signed the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which contained
Title XVII, entitled Ending Trafficking in Government Contracting.56 Title
XVII and Executive Order 13627 led to a proposed rule in the Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation, which implements and expands on the anti-trafficking
policies for federal contracts.57 The rule proposes a new policy applying to
contracts where the portion to be performed outside the United States ex-
ceeds $500,000.58 In those cases, companies must maintain a compliance
plan and certification that includes procedures to prevent agents and con-
tractors at any tier from engaging in human trafficking, and to monitor,
detect, and terminate those that have engaged in such practices.59
Another landmark anti-human trafficking legislation is the 2010 Califor-
nia Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA), which took effect January
1, 2012. It applies to retail sellers and manufacturers doing business in Cali-
fornia that have annual gross receipts exceeding one hundred million dol-
50. Tom Lantos Block Burmese Jade (Junta’s Anti-democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
286, 122 Stat. 2632 (2008).
51. U.S. Dep’t of State, Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements (2013),
available at http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/responsible-investment-reporting
-requirements-final.pdf.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112(a)(2),
114 Stat. 1464, 1486-88 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2008)).
54. Exec. Order No. 13,627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60029 (Oct. 1, 2012).
55. Id.
56. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 113th Cong. (2013)
(enacted).
57. Federal Acquisition Regulation: Ending Trafficking in Persons, 78 Fed. Reg. 59317 (Sept. 26,
2013).
58. Id. at 59318.
59. Id. at 59318–19.
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lars.60 The CTSCA requires applicable companies to disclose their efforts to
ensure that their supply chains are free from slavery and human traffick-
ing.61 It outlines activities that companies must report on their websites,
including supply chain verifications, audits, and training.62 Unlike section
1502, described below, the CTSCA only requires disclosure on a company’s
website.63
The CTSCA has served as a model for the proposed Business Supply
Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2014.64 If passed, this
bill would apply to all companies (not just retailers and manufacturers doing
business in California) with annual worldwide gross receipts exceeding one
hundred million dollars.65 These companies would be required to disclose
their efforts to identify and address specific human rights risks in their sup-
ply chains, including forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and the worst
forms of child labor.66 Unlike the California act, however, the proposed bill
would require companies to file annual reports with the SEC as is currently
required under the conflict minerals provision in section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.67
As compared to the legislation described above, section 1502 is the first
regulation to create binding rules on human rights-related due diligence
with regard to a company’s supply chain.68 It aims to curtail ethnic violence
in the DRC by shrinking the market for conflict minerals from mines con-
trolled by armed groups.69 As this Article will discuss in more detail in Part
II, this regulation requires public companies that manufacture or contract to
manufacture certain conflict minerals to disclose whether those minerals
originated in the DRC and surrounding countries. If so, they must exercise
due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the minerals and file a
report with the SEC.70 Putting aside the question of whether the legislation
is reducing ethnic violence, it can increase supply chain transparency and
potentially shape corporate behavior.71 But the challenge for section 1502,
and in fact all existing and future supply chain-related regulation, is how to
60. S.B. 657, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The exclusive remedy for failure to comply with the law is an action brought by the Attorney
General of California for injunctive relief. Id.
64. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2014, H.R. 4842, 113th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2014), available at https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4842 [herein-
after Business Supply Chain Transparency Act].
65. Id. at § 4.
66. Id.
67. See Business Supply Chain Transparency Act, supra note 64; Dodd-Frank Act § 1502 .
68. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502.
69. See id. at § 1502(a).
70. See id. at § 1502(b)(p).
71. For a discussion of whether securities regulation is the appropriate mechanism to hold companies
accountable for human rights-related abuses, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation,
54 Va. J. Int’l L. 97 (2013).
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effectively implement due diligence requirements given the multi-tiered
and fluid nature of supply chains as well as the power dynamics between
buyers and suppliers.
C. Why Supply Chain Regulation is Difficult to Implement
While a growing body of domestic regulation addresses social, environ-
mental, and human rights risks in supply chains, the complexity of supply
chains complicates the implementation of these laws. Many of the above
laws recommend (or in the case of section 1502, require) that companies
exercise due diligence on their third-party suppliers.72 Due diligence typi-
cally involves a company identifying actual or potential risks associated with
its activities and relationships, and taking steps to mitigate those risks.73
While firms already conduct this process on various business activities, ap-
plying it to supply chains presents unique challenges.
Global supply chains frequently include multiple layers of suppliers,
which may be difficult to trace and therefore regulate. Since companies often
rely on first-tier suppliers to identify and audit those in the second-tier, who
in turn identify and audit the next tier and so on, comprehensive monitor-
ing by the company may not be possible.74 Usually, companies can locate
first-tier suppliers, but those suppliers in the lower tiers are not so visible.75
Chains can comprise many tiers—when tracing the source of conflict miner-
als, for example, “there are often seven or eight layers in the supply chain
between the original artisanal mine and the final packaged good in the con-
sumer sector.”76 In fact, an employee of technology company Philips re-
marked that, “for electronic components, the supply chain can easily be 50
tiers deep, many of which may provide us with limited or no informa-
tion.”77 With so many layers, it can be difficult to identify all suppliers, let
alone conduct due diligence on them. For example, it took one company
72. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1(a); Lacey Act
§ 3372(a)(2)(A); U.S. Dep’t of State, Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Require-
ments, supra note 41.
73. According to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, companies should follow five steps when conducting due dili-
gence: (1) establish strong management systems, (2) identify and assess risk through supply chain map-
ping, (3) design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks, (4) conduct an independent
audit of supply chain due diligence, and (5) report annually on supply chain due diligence. See OECD
Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17.
74. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office Rep. No. GAO-13-689, SEC Conflict Minerals
Rule 25 (2013).
75. Id.
76. Cheuvreux Credit Agricole Group, Conflict Minerals 22 (ESG Thematic, Oct. 2012).
77. 60 second profile, Good Practice Newsletter (Int’l Council on Mining & Metals, London,
U.K.), June, 2008, at 12, quoted in Steven B. Young et al., Principles for Responsible Metals Supply to
Electronics, 6 Soc. Resp. J. 126, 131 (2010).
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more than a year to map its supply chain.78 Consequently, consultants have
advised companies required to comply with section 1502 to focus only on
their first tier of suppliers for the first two years of conflict mineral report-
ing (or four years for small companies), during which time the SEC has
relaxed its requirements.79 The transition period itself reflects the agency’s
acknowledgment of the time it takes firms to map their supply chains and
the different amounts of leverage that large versus small companies have
over their suppliers. As the SEC acknowledged, reporting companies average
160 to 10,000 first-tier suppliers each, and the number of potentially af-
fected suppliers is estimated to be 278,000.80
In fact, the power relationship between buyers and the first few tiers of
suppliers represents another complicating factor in the implementation of
supply chain regulation. When a company has a high degree of control over
its direct suppliers and the power to switch among suppliers, it can more
easily monitor and influence their behavior.81 It can also more effectively
pressure suppliers down the chain because of a multiplier effect whereby
“the influence of buyers on suppliers can force sub-suppliers to act in a
responsible manner.”82 Lead firms are thus better able to drive coordination,
enforce agreements, transmit environmental and human rights norms, and
conduct due diligence along their supply chains.83 In fact, they are “increas-
ingly adopting corporate sustainability programs as a means to establish
rules, oversight, and closer relationships with their suppliers: to work with
them directly to keep production costs down through eco-efficiencies while
also helping to ensure high-quality, reliable output.”84
78. See The Shift Project, Respecting Human Rights Through Global Supply Chains 7
(2012), available at http://shiftproject.org/publication/respecting-human-rights-through-global-supply-
chains-shift-workshop-report-no-2.
79. See Frank Monte, Managing Dir. of KPMG US, Remarks at the KPMG Conflict Minerals Seminar
in London (June 10, 2013) (on file with author). The SEC’s rule implementing section 1502 provides a
transition period of two years for large companies and four years for small companies. During this time,
companies can report their products as “DRC conflict undeterminable” and do not need to obtain an
audit of their Conflict Minerals Report. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56281.
80. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 74.
81. See Vandenbergh, supra note 11. Big brand retailers such as Walmart have used this leverage to
push suppliers to cut costs. See Peter Dauvergne & Jane Lister, Big Brand Sustainability: Governance Pros-
pects and Environmental Limits, 22 Global Envt’l Change 36, 40 (2012).
82. Stefan Ulstrup Hoejmose et al., Socially Responsible Supply Chains: Power Asymmetries and Joint Depen-
dence, 18 Supply Chain Mgmt. 277, 277 (2013). However, Hoejmose also notes that the multiplier
effect depends on suppliers having power over their suppliers down the chain. Where such power is
absent, the buyer will likely need to exert influence directly on sub-suppliers. See also Lutz Preuss, In
Dirty Chains? Purchasing and Greener Manufacturing, 34 J. Bus. Ethics 345 (2001); Omri Ben-Shahar &
James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 953,
969–70 (2006).
83. Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 78, 88
(2005); see also Daniel C. Bello & Meng Zhu, Global Supply Chain Control, in The Handbook of Global
Supply Chain Management 455, 462–67 (John T. Mentzer et al. eds., 2007); Esben Rahbek Pedersen,
The Many and the Few: Rounding Up the SMEs that Manage CSR in the Supply Chain, 14 Supply Chain
Mgmt. 109 (2009).
84. Dauvergne & Lister, supra note 81, at 40.
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Alternatively, if lead firms face high switching costs with respect to their
suppliers, lack the purchasing power to hold suppliers captive, and/or cannot
transmit tailored incentives that motivate cooperation, they have less influ-
ence and more difficulty exercising due diligence.85 This “lock-in situation”
may result in the lead firm tolerating non-compliant and opportunistic be-
havior by members of its supply chain.86 Opportunistic behavior tends to
increase as the geographic distance between buyers and sellers increases.87 In
these situations, suppliers may be “reluctant to disclose information about
their own supply chains, either for commercial reasons, or in a deliberate
attempt to circumvent the standards and requirements of buyers.”88 There-
fore, regulatory efforts are most effective when buyers have a high degree of
control over their suppliers.
A further challenge to implementation of supply chain laws is that supply
chains can be quite fluid and unpredictable even within the same industry.
According to one study:
Value chain governance patterns are not static or strictly associ-
ated with particular industries. They depend on the details of how
interactions between value chain actors are managed, and how
technologies are applied to design, production and the governance
of the value chain itself. Nor are value chain governance patterns
monolithic. Even in a particular industry in a particular place and
time, governance patterns may vary from one stage of the chain to
another.89
The volatility of supply chains can stem from such evolving factors as politi-
cal instability, technological changes, and legal developments. Their dy-
namic nature not only makes it challenging for a company to maintain an
updated list of suppliers and sub-suppliers, but it also complicates regula-
tory efforts as there may be a temptation for firms to shift their supply
chains away from the regulated regions.90
Because of power asymmetries between buyers and sellers, the difficulty
of mapping a company’s entire supply chain, and its constant fluidity, the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights recommend a prag-
matic approach whereby companies prioritize which areas of the supply
chain to map, which business relationships to engage in, and which adverse
85. See Parella, supra note 9, at 787–91 (describing how buyers can transmit effective incentives to
provoke coordination by suppliers).
86. See Bello & Zhu, supra note 83, at 458; see also Kenneth H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide, Opportunism in
Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions, 64 J. of Marketing 36 (2000).
87. See Hoejmose et al., supra note 82; Aksel I. Rokkan & Arnt Buvik, Inter-Firm Cooperation and the
Problem of Free Riding Behavior: An Empirical Study of Voluntary Retail Chains, 9 J. Purchasing & Supply
Mgmt. 247 (2003).
88. The Shift Project, supra note 78, at 4.
89. See Gereffi, supra note 83, at 96.
90. In the case of section 1502, some critics claimed that the legislation led to an initial embargo of
the DRC region. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 18; Tsui, supra note 18.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 16 21-AUG-15 12:04
434 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
human rights impacts to mitigate. The commentary to Guiding Principle
17 recognizes that:
Where business enterprises have large numbers of entities in their
value chains it may be unreasonably difficult to conduct due dili-
gence for adverse human rights impacts across them all. If so,
business enterprises should identify general areas where the risk of
adverse human rights impacts is most significant, whether due to
certain suppliers’ or clients’ operating contexts, the particular op-
erations, products or services involved, or other relevant
considerations.91
The UN Guiding Principles further identify factors that shape how a busi-
ness enterprise responds to potential adverse human rights impacts by one of
its partners. These factors include “the enterprise’s leverage over the entity
concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of
the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself
would have adverse human rights consequences.”92 If a business lacks suffi-
cient leverage over its suppliers, the Guiding Principles recommend ways
for it to increase its influence so as to prevent or mitigate negative human
rights impacts.93 The limited leverage that firms have on remote tiers of
their supply chains is further acknowledged by the OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas.94 Given the multiple challenges involved in con-
ducting supply chain due diligence, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach
for companies. As a result, regulation in this area is particularly complex and
may involve multiple tiers of outsourcing.
D. Regulating Outsourcing by Outsourcing Regulation
In response to complex, multi-tiered supply chains, we see complex,
multi-tiered regulation. Because of the nature of supply chains described
above, regulation of outsourcing is being outsourced to the regulated parties
themselves, who must secure compliance by their suppliers. This model
stands in contrast to accounts in existing literature, which have focused on
the outsourcing of regulation to NGOs, auditors, and other third parties.95
As this Article elaborates below, the outsourcing of regulation to regulated
parties themselves raises significant accountability concerns given that pri-
vate actors are performing functions that are fundamentally public.
91. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 31, at Principle 17 cmt.
92. Id. at Principle 19 cmt.
93. Id.
94. OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17, at 15, 33. The OECD Guidance also encourages
companies to work together and share information about suppliers, for example through industry initia-
tives. Id. at 39, 42.
95. See Freeman, supra note 11; Shapiro, supra note 11; Vandenbergh, supra note 11.
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Legal scholarship in the area of “new governance” has analyzed the in-
creasing privatization of public law and the development of public-private
governance.96 New governance regulatory mechanisms stand in contrast to
traditional command and control methods that are state-focused and rely on
specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior.97 The new governance
model is considered to be more flexible, participatory, and cost-efficient, and
may promote more innovation and tailoring to local circumstances.98 As part
of the trend toward public-private governance, there has been an outsourc-
ing of regulatory functions to third parties.99 Private actors can be involved
in public governance through a variety of ways, whether they are establish-
ing, implementing, or enforcing regulatory standards.100 In public-private
arrangements, there typically is an outsourcing of regulation to non-govern-
mental organizations, international agencies, experts, and firms.101 For ex-
ample, governments may hire private sector auditors to assess corporate
compliance with health and safety standards.102 Or they may require compa-
nies to hire accredited independent third parties to verify compliance
data.103 Firms can also implement self-regulatory standards through, for ex-
ample, voluntary codes of conduct.104
Yet supply chain regulation represents a distinct model of regulatory out-
sourcing. Under section 1502, the U.S. government is outsourcing to regu-
lated entities themselves, but not just for the purpose of self-regulation. The
state is deploying multinational companies to regulate themselves and indi-
rectly regulate other firms in their supply chain. Compliance by companies
is thus linked to compliance by their suppliers. As a result, companies listed
in the United States are responsible for implementing and enforcing regula-
tory standards on firms abroad, on behalf of the state. These firms (usually in
developing countries) would typically be beyond the reach of the state but
for the extraterritorial reach of domestic supply chain regulation. After the
state outsources to companies, those companies may further outsource the
regulation of suppliers to third parties, such as private consultants, industry
96. Id.
97. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 (2004); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229 (2003).
98. Lobel, supra note 97; Minow, supra note 97.
99. See Government By Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy (Jody Freeman &
Martha Minow eds., 2009); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
Rev. 1 (1997); Jody Freeman, Public Values in an Era of Privatization: Extending Public Law Norms Through
Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 (2003); Freeman, supra note 11; Shapiro, supra note 11;
Vandenbergh, supra note 11.
100. See Vandenbergh, supra note 11, at 117.
101. See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards
and Monitoring, 31 Pol’y Stud. J. 1 (2003).
102. See Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 61
(2014).
103. See Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2012).
104. See O’Rourke, supra note 101.
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groups, or other suppliers. While companies may regulate their direct sup-
pliers, those suppliers may regulate other firms down the chain. Therefore, a
chain of outsourcing emerges that involves layers of monitoring and enforce-
ment, and often competing systems of incentives.105
This chain of outsourcing regulation presents a number of implications
for companies and the state. It creates a new role for companies as not just
regulated entities but regulators themselves. Companies are setting stan-
dards for their suppliers and developing procedures for suspending or termi-
nating firms that do not comply with their sourcing policies. While
corporate codes of conduct have been on the rise for the past decade, supply
chain regulations raise the bar for the level of due diligence that companies
require in their codes.106 The outsourcing of regulation to companies re-
quires that firms locate and regulate their suppliers, which they may cur-
rently lack the resources and expertise to do effectively.
While the outsourcing of supply chain regulations may create opportuni-
ties for states to govern firms abroad typically outside their reach, this prac-
tice raises accountability concerns. Supply chain laws transfer authority from
regulators to private actors who are responsible for implementation and who
may then further outsource to private consultants. Assigning private parties
the role of implementing regulation is concerning given the lack of govern-
ment oversight and transparency to the public. This outsourcing is further
problematic because companies are responsible for conducting due diligence
themselves (as per the OECD Due Diligence Guidance), although they are
encouraged to participate in industry-wide initiatives that foster collabora-
tion among firms that share suppliers.107 Having a third party filter this
knowledge is not the goal and may not lead to the same organizational
learning or behavioral change in firms.
Scholars of public-private governance have recognized that with increased
efficiency and innovation come costs such as lack of transparency, limited
oversight, and weak accountability.108 The accountability costs are particu-
larly prevalent in supply chain regulation, which becomes further removed
from the state as it gets outsourced first to companies and then to other
suppliers and private consultants, thus creating second-order regulation,
third-order regulation, and so on.109 Interestingly, some anthropologists
have theorized supply chain management as an “ethic of detachment,”
where companies “are constantly engaged in establishing limits and
endpoints to relationships in their supply chain, ensuring that contracts are
time-bound and spatially defined, resisting proximity and intimacy, and
105. Id. at 6.
106. See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 Colum.
J. Transnat’l L. 389 (2005).
107. See OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17.
108. See Freeman, supra note 11, at 574–75; Vandenbergh, supra note 11, at 141–45.
109. See Vandenbergh, supra note 11, at 141–45.
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framing relationships around difference and distance.”110 As part of this
ethic of detachment, there are “multiple nodes of authority” that complicate
efforts to determine which actor was responsible for a particular decision or
action, as responsibility is redistributed across a network of actors.111 The
limited accountability along the supply chain is especially disconcerting
given that the purpose of these regulations is to enhance corporate accounta-
bility to the public and hold companies responsible for human rights viola-
tions in which they are complicit, whether wittingly or unwittingly.
II. Empirical Evidence from U.S. Conflict Minerals Legislation
In order to analyze the effectiveness of supply chain-related regulations
and their implications on state legitimacy and corporate accountability, this
Article presents a quantitative and qualitative study of the early implemen-
tation of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act on conflict minerals. The
quantitative component is based on a statistical analysis of the first set of
nearly 1,000 Conflict Minerals Reports that companies submitted to the
SEC in mid-2014. The aim is to understand the level of due diligence mea-
sures that companies have reported in their disclosures, which this Article
uses as a measure of the legislation’s potential to shape corporate behavior
with regard to responsible supply chain management. Through a close anal-
ysis of the disclosures and their conformity with the OECD Due Diligence
Guidance, this Article quantifies levels of weak, moderate, and strong due
diligence as well as correlations of due diligence levels with possible explan-
atory variables. This data analysis determines whether supply chain-related
regulation such as section 1502 has disparate effects on corporations, and by
doing so, develops a more nuanced theory of the emerging chain of out-
sourcing regulation. The focus is on the effects of section 1502 on corporate
behavior toward supply chain transparency, not on measuring the law’s im-
pact on local populations or whether it is curbing the conflict in the DRC.
Next, this Article discusses the challenges to implementation that explain
the high level of weak and moderate due diligence and the differentiation
among companies. It relies on ethnographic interviews with 25 people
within consultancies, industry groups, non-governmental organizations, and
law firms that are working with companies to comply with the legislation.
It also draws on participant observations from both international conferences
and within a consulting firm based in London that conducts conflict miner-
als due diligence and auditing.
110. Jamie Cross, Detachment as a Corporate Ethic: Materializing CSR in the Diamond Supply Chain, 60
Focaal: J. Global & Hist. Anthropology 34, 36 (2011). Cross identifies technologies of detachment
in the supply chain, including audits and codes of conduct that depersonalize, abstract, and “economize”
the supply chain, producing “decontextualized” relationships and knowledge.
111. McAllister, supra note 103, at 32.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 20 21-AUG-15 12:04
438 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
A. Section 1502
Within the growing body of domestic supply chain-related regulations,
section 1502 stands apart for its broad applicability to all publicly-traded
companies (including foreign issuers), the possibility of penalties attached to
non-compliance, and the requirement imposed on certain firms to exercise
supply chain due diligence. While section 1502 was passed in 2010 as part
of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC issued a final rule in 2012 following a long
public comment period.112 This provision requires public companies that
manufacture or contract to manufacture certain conflict minerals to disclose
whether their minerals originate from the DRC or any one of nine adjoining
countries.113 The rule requires disclosure on a new form to be filed with the
SEC (Form SD for specialized disclosure) as well as on company websites. If,
after conducting a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” issuers find that
the minerals originate in the covered countries and have reason to believe
they may not have come from recycled or scrap sources, they must exercise
due diligence on the source and chain of custody of their conflict minerals
and file a Conflict Minerals Report as an exhibit to Form SD.114 Companies
must also obtain an independent private sector audit of the Conflict Miner-
als Report.115 What is particularly notable about the rule is that it encour-
ages the use of an emerging international standard for supply chain due
diligence—the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.116
Acknowledging the initial difficulty of locating suppliers and determin-
ing the origin of a firm’s conflict minerals, the SEC relaxed some of its
requirements for two years for large companies and four years for small com-
panies.117 During this time, issuers can report their products as “DRC con-
flict undeterminable” and do not need to obtain an audit of their Conflict
112. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274. The U.S. Government Accountability Office cites several
reasons for the SEC’s delay in issuing its final rule—a significant learning curve, heavy rule-making
workload, and rigorous economic analysis in the rule-making process. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, supra note 74.
113. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 1502. The provision defines “conflict minerals” as cassiterite (tin
ore), columbite-tantalite (tantalum ore), wolframite (tungsten ore) and gold, and the nine adjoining
countries include Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville,
Angola, Zambia, and Tanzania. § 1502(e)(4). An issuer must determine whether any of its manufactured
products contain these minerals and whether such minerals are necessary to the functionality or produc-
tion of the manufactured product.
114. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56334. According to the rule, the reasonable country of
origin inquiry “does not require an issuer to determine to a certainty that all its conflict minerals did not
originate in the Covered Countries because the standard required is a reasonable inquiry, and requiring a
certainty in this setting would not be reasonable and may impose undue costs.” Id. at 56312–13.
115. Id. at 56276. Auditing is currently not a priority for companies because the SEC relaxed the
auditing requirements for the first two years for large companies and four years for smaller companies. Id.
at 56281. There were only three companies that obtained audits for their Conflict Minerals Reports
submitted in 2014: Intel, Kemet Corporation, and Signet Jewelers, Ltd.
116. See OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17.
117. The SEC has a variety of criteria for defining a smaller reporting company, chief among them
being that it is one with less than $75 million in outstanding shares owned by the public. “Smaller
reporting company” is defined in Rule 12b-2 [17 CFR 240.12b-2] under the Exchange Act.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 21 21-AUG-15 12:04
2015 / Shining Light on Global Supply Chains 439
Minerals Report.118 However, they still must exercise due diligence, includ-
ing taking steps to mitigate the risk that their conflict minerals benefit
armed groups.119 In addition, companies whose minerals originated from
recycled or scrap materials are required to file a Form SD but are exempted
from the due diligence requirement.120
Multiple legal and non-legal measures incentivize compliance with sec-
tion 1502. Unlike similar legislation such as the California Transparency in
Supply Chains Act, section 1502 imposes penalties on companies for not
reporting or complying in good faith.121 Form SD is deemed filed under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and subject to section 18 of the Exchange
Act, which attaches liability for any false or misleading statements.122 In
addition, the public disclosure component of section 1502 facilitates third-
party rankings and the leveraging of consumer, NGO, and investor pressure
on companies to become conflict-free.123 Some firms—most notably, Intel—
have preemptively decided to only use conflict-free materials, a step that is
not required under section 1502 but was likely motivated by the increased
attention to conflict minerals issues (as represented by the legislation).124
Section 1502 not only directly affects nearly 1,000 companies, but it also
indirectly affects thousands of suppliers to these companies. Moreover, Cali-
fornia and Maryland have passed laws to incentivize compliance with section
1502.125 These regulations prohibit companies in violation of the disclosure
requirements from contracting with California and Maryland state agencies.
The promotion of supply chain transparency is not confined to the United
States. In February 2012, the Democratic Republic of Congo passed a law
requiring all mining and mineral trading companies operating in the coun-
try to undertake due diligence on all levels of their supply chain according
to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.126 In Canada, a conflict minerals act
118. Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals (2014), U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm’n,
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.VOTiOcZOHNs.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56280.
122. Id.
123. There are already various consumer applications that track sustainability issues including specific
conflict minerals policies. See, e.g., Rankabrand, www.rankabrand.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2015);
GoodGuide, www.goodguide.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). In addition, Enough Project has pub-
lished a ranking of electronics companies in 2010 and 2012 based on a survey of their conflict minerals
policies and performance. See Enough Project, Conflict Minerals Company Rankings, Raise Hope for
Congo (2015), http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company-rankings.
124. See Intel, Conflict Minerals Sourcing Policy (2014), available at http://www.intel.com/
content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/conflict-minerals-policy-white-paper.pdf. In ad-
dition, based on this Article’s analysis, Intel is one of only three firms that submitted independently
audited Conflict Minerals Reports in 2014.
125. S.B. 861, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); H.B. 425 (Md. 2012). In addition, Connecticut and
Massachusetts have proposed more limited conflict minerals legislation.
126. See Ministe`re des Mines de la Re´publique De´mocratique du Congo, Arreˆte´ ministe´r-
iel N.0057.CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012: Portant mise en œuvre du Me´canisme Re´gional de Cer-
tification de la Confe´rence Internationale sur la Re´gion des Grands-Lacs « CIRGL » en
Re´publique De´mocratique du Congo, Article 8, available at http://mines-rdc.cd/fr/documents/
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was introduced in the House of Commons in 2013 that would require Cana-
dian companies to exercise due diligence in sourcing minerals from the
Great Lakes Region of Africa, also in accordance with the OECD Due Dili-
gence Guidance.127 Finally, in late May 2015, the European Parliament en-
dorsed a mandatory regulation on the responsible sourcing of minerals from
conflict-affected and high-risk areas.128  The proposed law, which is esti-
mated to affect over 800,000 European companies, includes a mandatory
certification program involving independent third-party audits for smelters
and refiners.129  As compared to section 1502, the European regulation
would have a broader geographic scope, as it would apply to conflict miner-
als sourced in all conflict-affected areas (not just in the DRC region).  The
European Parliament will next engage in negotiations with European mem-
ber states on the text of the proposed regulation, which will need final ap-
proval from the European Council to become law.
Section 1502 was highly contested at its adoption and remains controver-
sial. According to the stated rationale behind the law, curbing the illegiti-
mate exploitation of natural resources by state and non-state armed groups
will indirectly hinder financing of the ongoing conflicts in the eastern DRC.
Yet observers worry about high compliance costs,130 whether the law prop-
erly falls under the mandate of the SEC, and whether it has improved the
local human rights situation or hindered the economic development of the
region.131 In addition, protracted litigation threatens the rule; in August
2012, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, and industry
groups filed petitions in U.S. courts to modify or nullify the rule.132 The
Arrete_0057_2012.pdf; see also Press Release, Global Witness, Congo Government Enforces Law to Curb
Conflict Mineral Trade (May 21, 2012), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/li
brary/Congo_government_enforces_law_to_curb_conflict_minerals_trade.pdf.
127. Conflict Minerals Act, H.C. C-486, 41st Parl. (Can.) (2013), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6062040&File=4.
128. See Press Release, European Parliament News, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Ask for Mandatory Certi-
fication of EU Importers (May 20, 2015), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150513IPR55318/html/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-mandatory-certification-of-
EU-importers.
129. See European Parliament Votes for Tougher Measures on Conflict Minerals, THE GUARDIAN (May 21,
2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/21/european-parliament-
tougher-measures-conflict-minerals.
130. The SEC estimates the initial cost of compliance to be between $3 billion and $4 billion, with
annual costs thereafter of between $207 million and $609 million. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at
56334.
131. For further history and critique of section 1502, see Christiana Ochoa & Patrick Keenan, Regu-
lating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3
Goettingen J. Int’l L. 129 (2011); Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation,
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 105 (2012); Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New
Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1315 (2012).
132. On October 19, 2012, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, and Business Roundtable filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit re-
questing that the conflict minerals rule be modified or nullified. Brief of Petitioners, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2013) (No. 12-1422), available at http://www.srz.com/files/
upload/Conflict_Minerals_Resource_Center/NAM_Chamber_of_Commerce_vs_SEC_Final_Opening_
Brief_of_the_Petitioners.pdf. After the Circuit Court ruled in a related case involving Section 1504 that
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most recent development was a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit that largely upheld the law, rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that
the rule is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure
Act.133 However, the court found the law’s requirement that issuers describe
their products as “not been found to be DRC conflict-free,” amounts to
“compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment.134 While compa-
nies are no longer required to report whether their products are “DRC con-
flict-free,” the SEC announced that the court decision did not affect issuers’
obligation to file their reports by the June 2, 2014 deadline.135 Putting aside
the court challenges and the local effect of the law on ethnic violence in the
DRC, this Article focuses on whether section 1502 can increase corporate
supply chain transparency.
B. A Due Diligence Gap Among Companies
The mid-2014 submission of the first set of Conflict Minerals Reports
(CMRs) to the SEC provides an opportunity to analyze the early implemen-
tation of section 1502 as well as factors that could explain a due diligence
gap among companies. This analysis covers 967 reports, which are publicly
available on the SEC’s website.136 These reports are all CMRs filed between
April 1, 2014 and June 30, 2014 that could be matched with fiscal year
2012 financial data from Compustat.137 Below I describe the methodology
used to determine due diligence levels and the results from ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions with a number of explanatory variables.
The first step was to determine the level of due diligence among the
companies that submitted a CMR. Because these companies were required
to conduct due diligence on their supply chain based on the OECD Due
Diligence Guidance, I selected the following five factors from the OECD
Guidance to analyze due diligence levels. These factors represent the first
four steps of the OECD’s five-step framework for risk-based due diligence.
The fifth OECD step is simply a requirement for companies to publicly
jurisdiction resided with the lower court (Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d. 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013)),
the plaintiffs opposing rule 1502 requested transfer of the case to the District Court. Petitioner’s Motion
to Transfer, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://
www.conflictmineralslaw.com/files/2013/04/Motion-to-Transfer.pdf.
133. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
134. Id.
135. See Keith F. Higgins, Director, SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Statement on the Effect of
the Recent Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994.
136. Note that I only analyzed companies that submitted Conflict Minerals Reports. I excluded com-
panies that only submitted Form SDs but did not file Conflict Minerals Reports. Companies in this
category include those that determined that their conflict minerals did not originate in the DRC or only
came from recycled/scrap sources.
137. I use 2012 financial data (instead of the more recent 2013 data) in the regression analysis to help
alleviate the concern that an unobserved time-varying variable could simultaneously affect both the due
diligence rate as well as the explanatory financial variables. (However, this change would not alleviate the
concern of time-invariant unobservable variables that could affect both sides of the regression.)
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report on their supply chain policies and practices, which all of the compa-
nies have fulfilled based on their submission of a CMR to the SEC.138 I
selected two factors to represent OECD step one because this step (“Estab-
lish strong company management systems”) covers a number of important
corporate policies that are essential to an effective due diligence process.139 I
also selected factors that companies did not universally adopt so as to differ-
entiate firms. For example, almost all companies state that they have a sup-
ply chain policy, so that factor would not have been a useful one to use. For
each of the five factors, companies were coded with a 1 if their CMR indi-
cated that the factor was present, and a 0 if their CMR did not indicate that
the factor was present.
1. Company maintains a system of long-term record-keeping on its supply
chain.
This factor is a component of step one of the OECD due diligence frame-
work (“Establish strong company management systems”).140 It is listed as a
recommendation for downstream companies (which comprise almost all of
the issuers) as part of the requirement to “establish a system of controls and
transparency over the mineral supply chain.”141
2. Company incorporates its supply chain policy and due diligence process into
present/future contracts or ancillary agreements with suppliers.
This factor is another component of step one of the OECD due diligence
framework. It is listed as part of the requirement to “strengthen company
engagement with suppliers.”142 The factor allows for incorporation into fu-
ture contracts because contracts may not have been able to be renegotiated
during the previous fiscal year. There must be an expressly stated intention
to incorporate conflict minerals provisions into contracts or agreements.143
3. Company surveyed all of its suppliers of conflict minerals and followed up
with non-responsive suppliers or incomplete surveys.
This factor is a component of step two of the OECD due diligence frame-
work (“Identify and assess risk in the supply chain”).144 The requirement
that companies follow up with non-responsive suppliers or incomplete
138. See OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17, at 52–53.
139. Id. at 36–40.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 39. “Downstream companies” refers to firms whose supply chains move from smelters/
refiners to retailers. These companies include metal traders and exchanges, component manufacturers,
product manufacturers, original equipment manufacturers, and retailers. Id. at 33.
142. See id. at 17.
143. If the company stated that it incorporates conflict mineral requirements into its supplier code of
conduct, it would only be coded as a 1 under this factor if compliance with its code of conduct was
mandated through supplier contracts or agreements.
144. See OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17, at 17.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 25 21-AUG-15 12:04
2015 / Shining Light on Global Supply Chains 443
surveys is one of the expectations for conflict minerals reporting cited by
prominent NGOs, The Enough Project and Responsible Sourcing Net-
work145 (Incomplete or uncompleted surveys are treated as “red flags.”).146
For an issuer to be coded as a 1, it must have received responses from 100%
of suppliers surveyed or have followed up with non-responsive suppliers.
The relevant suppliers here are all “in-scope” suppliers, defined as any sup-
plier that could have reasonably supplied products that include conflict min-
erals. If a company excluded non-major suppliers or suppliers that were not
certain to be providing products that could include conflict minerals, it re-
ceived a 0.
4. Company has a stated policy of working with suppliers to mitigate risk in
its supply chain, including the possibility of terminating its
relationship with suppliers.
This factor is a component of step three of the OECD due diligence frame-
work (“Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks”).147
It is listed as part of the requirement to “devise and adopt a risk manage-
ment plan.”148 If the CMR stated that termination was a possible conse-
quence of non-compliance, even if no terminations occurred for this reason
during the previous year, the issuer was coded as a 1.
5. Company has a policy of directly encouraging smelters/refiners to become
certified.
This factor is a component of both step three of the OECD due diligence
framework (“Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified
risks”) and step four (“Carry out independent third-party audit of smelter/
refiner’s due diligence practices”).149 Since suppliers typically rely on third-
party certification schemes to audit smelters/refiners, encouraging certifica-
tion is a part of the risk management requirement under step three.150 It is
also necessary in order to facilitate the step four requirement to audit smelt-
ers and refiners. According to expectations published by The Enough Pro-
ject and Responsible Sourcing Network, “an issuer should support smelters
in becoming verified as conflict free, [which] can be accomplished by en-
couraging smelters to be audited through the CFS Program or its
equivalent.”151 Coding issuers with a 1 under this factor required direct en-
couragement of smelters/refiners. For example, if a CMR referenced a policy
145. Darren Fenwick & Patricia Jurewicz, Enough Project & Responsible Sourcing Network, Expecta-
tions for Companies’ Conflict Mineral Reporting (2013), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Ex
pectations-for-Companies-Conflict-Minerals-Reporting.pdf.
146. Id.
147. See OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 17, at 44.
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id. at 44, 47.
150. Id. at 44–46.
151. Fenwick & Jurewicz, supra note 145, at 9.
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of indirect encouragement (i.e., the issuer encourages its suppliers to en-
courage their suppliers to encourage the smelters to become certified), the
company was coded as 0.
The above five factors were used to code the 967 CMRs. Each company
was then assigned a total score of 0-5 by adding the scores for each factor. I
name this total score OECDComply. Thus, if a company had all five factors
present, it received a 5, while a company with none of the factors present
received a 0. The table below summarizes the frequency and percentage of
companies with scores 0-5:
Table 1: Frequency Table of OECDComply
Total Score Given to CMR:
OECDComply Frequency Percentage
0 159 16.44
1 305 31.54
2 267 27.61
3 165 17.06
4 63 6.51
5 8 0.83
I interpret only those companies with scores of 4 and 5 as exhibiting
strong due diligence, meaning that they are conducting comprehensive sup-
ply chain due diligence according to the OECD framework and best prac-
tices outlined by The Enough Project and Responsible Sourcing Network.
The companies with scores of 0 through 3 feature weak or moderate due
diligence. Therefore, based on the 2014 CMRs, only 7.34% of companies
disclosed strong due diligence measures.
Table 2: Due Diligence Rate for Companies Filing CMRs
Due Diligence Level OECDComply Frequency Percentage
Weak Due Diligence 0-1 464 47.98
Moderate Due Diligence 2-3 432 44.67
Strong Due Diligence 4-5 71 7.34
To further understand which characteristics of companies are associated
with stronger due diligence, I conduct an OLS regression of total score
(OECDComply) against a series of explanatory variables—see the Appendix
for detailed definitions of each variable used in the regression. While such
an analysis cannot be considered a causal explanation for the due diligence
gap, the conditional correlations can be considered as a baseline assessment.
This empirical analysis presents an invitation for dialogue among researchers
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and practitioners to develop more robust reporting requirements and assess
which factors influence companies’ compliance.
I examined a number of firm-specific factors to explain why certain com-
panies had a higher score as compared to other companies. Is a company’s
level of due diligence correlated with its brand strength (as measured by the
ratio of advertising expenditure to sales), size (as measured by the natural
logarithm of total balance sheet assets), profitability (as measured by the
ratio of net income to total assets), or liquidity (the ratio of cash to assets)?
These factors test two hypotheses: The first is that companies with strong
brands are more subject to consumer pressure and concerned about their
reputation, thus making these companies more likely to exhibit strong due
diligence as well. The second hypothesis is that larger companies (proxied by
assets), as well as those with more resources (proxied by profitability and
liquidity) are more capable of investing in due diligence programs and are
more likely to exhibit strong due diligence under section 1502. To better
isolate these firm-specific factors, I included industry control variables at the
two-digit SIC level.
I also included several external factors that may correlate with a com-
pany’s due diligence score: (i) whether a company referenced global and in-
region responsible sourcing initiatives, which would suggest the role of
these initiatives in helping firms conduct their due diligence; and (ii)
whether a company complied with the California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act of 2010, which requires firms to disclose human rights risks in
their supply chain. These hypotheses are tested by including the dummy
variables CFSI, OtherRef_1, OtherRef_2plus, and CalTSCA in the estimating
equation.
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Table 3: Regression Results of Total Score (OECDComply)
Ad_Sales 4.13**
(1.77)
Log_Assets .057***
(.021)
ROA .055***
(.019)
Liquidity -.395
(.265)
CFSI .302***
(.079)
OtherRef_1 .343**
(.146)
OtherRef_2plus .418**
(.193)
CalTSCA .201*
(.112)
Constant .481
(.370)
Number of Observations 967
R-squared .084
The dependent variable in this OLS Regression is OECDComply. Two-digit SIC industry
controls are included (but not shown). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
There is a statistically and practically significant relationship between
OECDComply and the following variables: Ad_Sales, a measure of brand (the
ratio of advertising expenditure to sales) and Log_Assets, a proxy for firm size
(the natural logarithm of total balance sheet assets). There is also a signifi-
cant relationship of OECDComply to variables based on references from the
Conflict Mineral Reports: CFSI, which measures reference to the Conflict-
Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) or the Conflict-Free Smelter Program
(CFSP); and OtherRef_1 and OtherRef_2plus, which are dummy variables that
measure reference to stakeholder initiatives other than CFSI/CFSP (either
referencing exactly 1 initiative, or 2 or more initiatives). The variable CalT-
SCA, which measures compliance with the California Transparency in Sup-
ply Chains Act, while weakly significant (at the 10% level), is practically
significant.
The variable ROA, a measure of profitability (the ratio of net income to
total assets), while statistically significant, is of little practical significance
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in the model.152 The variable liquidity (the ratio of cash to assets) is not
statistically significant. Industry dummy variables are included as controls,
none of which are individually significant either.
Brand strength, which is proxied by the ratio of advertising expenditures
to net sales, has a practically significant effect only for firms with an adver-
tising-to-sales ratio in the top 5% of the sample.153 Companies with strong
brands are concerned about their reputation and are more likely than other
firms to respond to pressure by consumers, NGOs, and socially responsible
investors. Hence, these firms are more likely to report comprehensive supply
chain due diligence in their CMRs.
Reference to the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative is another strong ex-
planatory variable for total score. This result highlights the importance of
this initiative, which certifies smelters as conflict-free based on an indepen-
dent third-party audit.154 Developed by members of the Electronic Industry
Citizenship Coalition and the Global e-Sustainability Program, this pro-
gram is widely used by companies in various industries because smelters and
refiners are considered the “choke point” of the supply chain.155 Companies
that can trace their minerals to a CFSI-certified smelter can claim that the
minerals in their products are conflict-free.
My analysis also measured reference to the following global and in-region
responsible sourcing initiatives (aside from CFSI): (1) The Responsible Jew-
elry Council Chain-of-Custody Certification Program; (2) the International
Tin Supply Chain Initiative; (3) the London Bullion Market Association Re-
sponsible Gold Program; (4) Solutions for Hope; (5) the Public-Private Alli-
ance for Responsible Minerals Trade; (6) the Tungsten Conflict Mineral
Council; and (7) the Conflict-Free Tin Initiative. These stakeholder initia-
tives may facilitate compliance with section 1502, an observation made by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office and confirmed by the data.156
The model predicts that a CMR that references one of the previously enu-
merated initiatives would be expected to have an increase in OECDComply of
.34, all else being equal. At the same time, a CMR that references two or
more initiatives is expected to have an increase of .42 to OECDComply,
which is only slightly higher than a CMR that only references a single initi-
152. Even when comparing firms at the extreme ends of the ROA distribution, the predicted effect on
OECDComply is not practically large. The first percentile of ROA in the sample is -.721, whereas the 99th
percentile is .283. Thus, the difference in the predicted score of OECDComply between a firm in the 99th
ROA percentile and a firm at the first ROA percentile is only .283*.055 - (-.721*.055) = .06.
153. Many firms do not report advertising expenditures in Compustat, as it is not a material expense
for them. I assume the dollar value of advertising for these firms is 0. As a result, the median value of
Ad_Sales is 0, and the average value is .008. The 95th percentile of Ad_Sales in the sample is .044.
Therefore, the predicted effect on OECDComply for a firm with an Ad_Sales value at the 95th percentile is
4.11*.044 = .181.
154. See Conflict-Free Smelter Program, Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative, http://www.conflict
freesourcing.org/conflict-free-smelter-program/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
155. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 74, at 16 n.29.
156. See id. at 12–17.
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ative. As this Article will describe in more detail in the following section,
the initiatives sometimes compete or overlap with each other so there may
not be as much value added when a company is involved in more than one
initiative (aside from CFSI).
In addition, there is a statistically significant relationship between
Log_Assets and total score, which suggests that larger firms are more likely
to have a higher total score.157 This observation reflects the fact that con-
ducting supply chain due diligence requires significant resources, which
larger firms are more able to invest.
Finally, the explanatory variable CalTSCA is statistically significant as
well. This variable measured whether companies complied with the Califor-
nia Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, as reflected in the
KnowTheChain dataset that checks whether applicable companies posted
statements that addressed at least three of the five statutory requirements.158
An issuer that had received a checkmark from KnowTheChain would be ex-
pected to receive a higher total score than otherwise. This result suggests
that the California Act and section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act are comple-
mentary pieces of legislation. Companies required to comply with the Cali-
fornia act had to gather information on their supply chain which facilitated
their compliance with section 1502.
C. Challenges to Implementation
Aside from the above explanatory variables, what other factors may ex-
plain the due diligence gap in the data? Ethnographic interviews and par-
ticipant observation provide context to the data analysis above and reveal a
number of other challenges to implementation that companies currently face
or will face once the transition period ends in two to four years. Below, this
Article identifies three factors that are hindering compliance: (1) interna-
tional norms on supply chain due diligence are in their infancy; (2) there is a
proliferation of certification standards and in-region sourcing initiatives that
are still evolving and sometimes competing; and (3) inadequate local secur-
ity and weak governance are inhibiting the mapping of the mineral trade
and the tracing of minerals in the region.
A first obstacle that companies face is the dearth of guidance as to how to
interpret and implement evolving international norms on supply chain due
diligence. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
157. This effect is practically significant when comparing the largest and smallest firms in the sam-
ple. The 10th percentile of Log_Assets is 4.15, whereas the 90th percentile is 9.75. Thus, the difference in
the predicted score of OECDComply between a firm in the 90th percentile of size and a firm in the 10th
percentile of size is 9.75*.057 - 4.15*.057 = .32.
158. Using this data set, I found that out of the companies that submitted CMRs, 201 firms were also
required to comply with the California Act. Out of those 201 companies, 158 received a checkmark from
KnowTheChain that indicated compliance. These 158 firms have a value of 1 for CalTSCA, while all other
firms in the sample have a value of 0. See About Us, KnowTheChain, https://www.knowthechain.org/
about-us/ (last visited on Mar. 28, 2015).
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which outline due diligence as a key step for companies to undertake, were
only endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011.159 At that time,
the Human Rights Council created a five-member expert working group to
help implement and disseminate the Guiding Principles over the next three
years.160 Similarly, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance was approved in
2011 by the body’s Investment Committee and Development Assistance
Committee.161 Since 2011, the OECD has been working with the U.N.
Group of Experts on the DRC and the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region (ICGLR) to develop implementation tools and best prac-
tices.162 Part of the implementation phase has included translation of the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance, training and outreach activities in mineral
producing regions, and the development of industry/sector guides.163 Yet
questions remain as to how to interpret the norms articulated in the OECD
Guidance. For example, it is unclear the extent to which companies are al-
lowed to rely on outside initiatives to conduct due diligence on their be-
half.164 Companies that must comply with section 1502 are therefore
struggling with how to apply these recently developed norms on supply
chain due diligence, especially in the face of little initial guidance from the
SEC and the complexities associated with locating and auditing third-party
suppliers.165
Companies are also facing a proliferation of sometimes-competing certifi-
cation standards and sourcing initiatives developed by industry groups, gov-
ernmental bodies, and consulting firms, which are trying to capitalize on the
growing business for implementation services.166 The global and in-region
sourcing initiatives assist companies in conducting supply chain due dili-
gence and responsibly sourcing conflict minerals. While the data analysis
above shows a correlation between CMRs that reference exactly one initia-
tive (other than CFSI) and OECDComply, there was only a slight increase in
total score when a company referenced two or more initiatives. In other
words, the programs may be competing or redundant in some respects and
159. See U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: An Introduction 2, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Business/Intro_Guiding_PrinciplesBusinessHR.pdf.
160. See H.R.C. Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011).
161. See OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, C/MIN(2011)12/FINAL (May 25,
2011), available at http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDACTS/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?Instru
mentID=268&InstrumentPID=302&Lang=en&Book=False.
162. See 7th ICGLR-OECD-UN GoE Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains, Update on the
OECD Implementation Programme: Gold and 3T (May 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/3TG-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Implementation-Programme-May-2014.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Interview with Hannah Koep, Channel Research (July 2, 2012).
165. See infra Section III.A.
166. A notable exception is the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative, whose significance is evident in the
correlation between CMRs that reference CFSI and those with a high total score that reflects comprehen-
sive due diligence. See supra Section II.B.
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not necessarily providing a value-added as companies are involved in more
initiatives. This theory is bolstered by this Article’s qualitative research.
For instance, one of the newly created initiatives is the Better Sourcing
Program (BSP), launched in 2014 by Resource Consulting Services, Ltd.
BSP, which is under public consultation and currently being piloted in the
DRC, is aimed at companies complying with section 1502 and the proposed
EU Regulation on Conflict Minerals. It assists firms with their due diligence
on the upstream (mine to smelter) part of the mineral supply chain.167 Yet
BSP is trying to differentiate itself in a crowded market of already existing
standards. Here is its attempt to do so, according to its consultation draft:
The Better Sourcing Program recognizes the complexities and as-
sociated communication challenges arising from the multitude of
initiatives designed to assess supply chain due diligence practices.
Therefore, the Better Sourcing Standard has been designed to mir-
ror existing standards from the ICGLR Regional Certification
Mechanism, while fully operationalizing principles and recom-
mendations from the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsi-
ble Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-
Risk Areas (OECD Guidance), and aligning with requirements
from the Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP) audit protocols.
The Better Sourcing Program further recognizes the RJC [Re-
sponsible Jewelry Council] Code of Practices (CoP) as a leading
Standard applicable to mineral supply chains and draws on the
RJC CoP.168
The BSP statement above refers to the ICGLR Regional Certification Mech-
anism, which is currently under development and expected to be eventually
integrated into the national law of its member states in the Great Lakes
Region. This mechanism is one of several in-region sourcing initiatives that
are concurrently trying to track and monitor minerals from mine to smelter.
Other such initiatives include the International Tin Research Institute’s Tin
Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) and the Certified Trading Chains of the
German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR).169
The Responsible Jewelry Council has also developed a chain-of-custody cer-
tification program for the tracking of conflict-free gold.170 Other standards
167. See Better Sourcing Program, The Better Sourcing Standard Consultation Draft (Apr. 1, 2014),
available at http://bsp-assurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/better-sourcing-standard-consultation
-draft-3.0.pdf.
168. Id. at 2.
169. See iTSCi Project Overview, Int’l Tin Res. Inst., https://www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=
com_zoo&task=item&item_id=2192&Itemid=189; Mineral Certification at the BGR, BGR, http://
www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/CTC/Home/CTC_node_en.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2015).
170. See Responsible Jewelry Council, Chain of Custody Standard (2012), available at http://www.
responsiblejewellery.com/files/S002_2012_RJC_CoC_Standard_PM.pdf.
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for tracking gold that claim to be compatible and mutually supportive are
the World Gold Council’s Conflict-Free Gold Standard and the London Bul-
lion Market Association’s Responsible Gold Guidance, the first of which is
aimed at upstream companies and the second for downstream companies.171
Clearly, industry groups and consulting firms are attempting to carve out
niche assurance services for companies that are unfamiliar with how to con-
duct due diligence or unwilling to do it themselves. Yet one wonders how
much coordination or rather competition is actually occurring among the
plethora of standards, initiatives, and certification providers. According to
Hannah Koep, who formerly worked at Channel Research, a consultancy
that has been helping design audit standards and governance assessment
tools relating to conflict minerals due diligence since 2011:
It is surprising to see how difficult it is to harmonize, and how
difficult it is to get different standards to work together. And to
see how much money gets pumped into different initiatives, in-
stead of actually harmonizing and bringing them together. . . .
[A]t an earlier stage when all of the schemes were in their infancy,
it would have been easier to join resources and join efforts. By
now, everyone has run in slightly different directions and has
slightly different implementation standards. And I think that it is
more difficult to backpedal now and see how to bring them all
together.172
Patricia Jurewicz of the Responsible Sourcing Network agrees and adds:
“Why is everybody funding these parallel projects simultaneously when no-
body has enough money to do it all?”173 In addition to possible fragmenta-
tion, many of the initiatives and standards also suffer from a lack of
transparency—an irony given that their aim is to promote supply chain
transparency. For instance, iTSCi (a traceability and due diligence program
that creates auditable chains of custody) does not release data or incident
reports to the public and charges a steep fee for membership.174 Control over
data may be a way for initiatives such as iTSCi to create a monopoly for their
services in the upstream assurance market and crowd out competing pro-
171. See Press Release, The London Bullion Market Association, LBMA Supports WGC’s Conflict-
Free Gold Standard (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/LBMA_in%20_support
_of_WGCs_conflict_standard.pdf; see also World Gold Council, Conflict-Free Gold Standard: An Intro-
duction (2012), available at http://www.gold.org/sites/default/files/documents/WGC172_Conflict_Free_
Gold_brochure_0.pdf; London Bullion Market Association, Responsible Gold Guidance (2013), available
at http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/RGG20130118.pdf. Upstream companies operate in the mine-to-
smelter phase of the mineral supply chain, while downstream companies operate from the smelter to the
final product.
172. Interview with Hannah Koep, Channel Research (July 2, 2013).
173. Interview with Patricia Jurewicz, Director, Responsible Sourcing Network (Aug. 21, 2013).
174. Interview with Joanne Lebert, Director, Great Lakes Program, Partnership Africa Canada (July
31, 2013).
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grams. Yet promoting transparency in corporate supply chains could create a
culture of transparency among the organizations supporting this aim.
While there is overlap and a lack of harmonization among some of the
initiatives, there are certain areas where in-region sourcing is still in nascent
stages. For example, most initiatives have focused on tin, tantalum, and
tungsten, while a gold traceability scheme is still in its pilot phase.175 There
are currently no chain-of-custody technologies for gold production (iTSCi
only works on the other three conflict minerals) and no tracking system for
gold in the Great Lakes Region.176 While the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initia-
tive has recently certified smelters for all four conflict minerals (with almost
one-fourth of the smelters used by electronic companies already certified),177
there are still many uncertified smelters, particularly for tungsten, tin, and
gold.178 According to the Government Accountability Office, as of April
2014, there are 110 smelters and refiners that have been certified or working
toward certification, out of a total of approximately 500 worldwide.179
The under-development of certain sourcing initiatives is in part a result of
inadequate local security and weak governance in the region.180 These factors
inhibit mapping and traceability particularly for minerals that are ar-
tisanally mined in the DRC region. The area suffers from a lack of local
governance institutions, with “almost 20,000 UN troops provid[ing] the
only infrastructure support in certain [areas].”181 Moreover, inadequate in-
frastructure, including inconsistent power supply, hinders the ability of ini-
tiatives to operate in the region.182 Illegal armed groups pose another
challenge to efforts to map the region and continuously monitor mines, thus
compromising attempts to export conflict-free minerals from those areas.183
Given the unstable political environment and prevalence of corruption, gov-
ernment forces themselves are sometimes responsible for perpetrating vio-
lence and hindering the mapping of mining sources.184 Local governments
lack the capacity to curb violence, cross-border smuggling, and corruption,
thus leaving artisanal mines (small-scale mines by independent miners not
employed by a mining company) largely unregulated and suffering from
precarious work conditions.185 A mining engineer, who is trying to set up
175. See Conflict-Free Artisanal Gold, Partnership Africa Canada, http://www.pacweb.org/en/con
flict-free-gold (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
176. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 74, at 15.
177. See Ken Kaplan, Helter Smelter No More: Moving to Conflict-Free Minerals, iQ by Intel (Jan. 9,
2014), http://iq.intel.com/helter-smelter-no-more-moving-to-conflict-free-minerals.
178. Id.
179. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Rep. No. GAO-14-575, Report to Congres-
sional Committees, Conflict Minerals: Stakeholder Options for Responsible Sourcing Are
Expanding, But More Information on Smelters Is Needed 23 (2014).
180. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 74, at 17–20.
181. See Cheuvreux Credit Agricole Group, supra note 76, at 19.
182. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 179, at 29.
183. Id. at 17–18.
184. See Cheuvreux Credit Agricole Group, supra note 76, at 19.
185. Id. at 21.
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fair trade gold certification in Uganda, notes the smuggling among some of
the tantalum producers in Rwanda:
They’re selling to Rwandan buyers, and not particularly legally.
Although it is a certified site in Rwanda, based on their economic
calculations, it makes more sense for them to produce less at their
mine in Rwanda, and buy the ore at a lower price from Ugandan
producers, smuggle it back into Rwanda, and register it as certi-
fied production from their mine.186
The engineer further remarks that not only are there not enough mine
agents to inspect mines and mitigate corruption, but existing government
agents are tempted by bribes to let minerals pass through uninspected.187
Given the security situation and weak local infrastructure, there is disa-
greement and a lack of clarity over how to map the region. While the U.S.
State Department developed a conflict minerals map in accordance with sec-
tion 1502 to show trade routes, mineral-rich zones, and areas under the
control of armed groups in the DRC, it acknowledges such limitations as
the lack of verifiable data, the constantly changing situation on the ground,
and the inaccessibility of many of the mine sites.188 Moreover, it is unclear
how accurate such a map can be given the difficulty defining who is an
armed group, whether state armed groups should be counted, and what defi-
nition of conflict should be used.189 The various standards and sourcing ini-
tiatives are themselves at odds over the definition of precluded armed
groups. For instance, the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative does not allow
any armed groups to be present at mine sites including state armed groups,
while iTSCi (in line with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance) allows the
presence of public and private security forces (including state armed groups)
at a mine site on the condition that they are not violating human rights.190
Going forward, it will be important to harmonize initiatives as to which
armed groups should be included and gather more reliable data to determine
the conflict zones in the DRC.
III. How to Implement Supply Chain Regulations Effectively
With the growing movement toward domestic supply chain laws, it is
critical to mind the due diligence gap that exists in the case of section 1502,
186. Interview with Jennifer Hinton, independent consultant and Uganda-based mining engineer
(Aug. 3, 2013).
187. Id.
188. See Democratic Republic of the Congo Mineral Exploitation by Armed Groups & Other Entities, U.S.
Dep’t of State (May 23, 2012), https://hiu.state.gov/Products/DRC_ConflictMinerals_2012May23
_HIU_U540.pdf.
189. See Gisa Roesen & Estelle Levin, Conformance and Compatibility Analysis: CFS, iT-
SCi, and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance iii, 32–33 (2011).
190. See id.
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as well as to address the accountability concerns involved in outsourcing
regulation. This Article argues that home states (the United States, in this
instance) need to provide guidance and more support toward implementing
supply chain laws. This is particularly challenging because of supply chain
laws’ extraterritorial nature and the difficulties of regulating complex,
multi-tiered supply chains. The obstacles to implementation mentioned
above—the weak governance and security situation that inhibit traceability
and mapping in regulated regions, the evolving nature of sometimes com-
peting certification standards and in-region sourcing initiatives, and the nas-
cent stage of international norms on supply chain due diligence—highlight
the need for local capacity-building, development and centralized coordina-
tion of sourcing initiatives and standards, and support to companies still
struggling with compliance. In addition to an enhanced role for home states,
companies need to invest in a culture of compliance led by an interdiscipli-
nary team of employees from multiple departments and featuring organiza-
tional learning around supply chain management.
A. A Greater Role for the State
Enhancing the role of home states in the implementation of supply chain
regulations can minimize potential accountability costs and improve com-
pliance rates. Supply chain laws feature a distinct model of outsourcing
whereby the government outsources to regulated entities themselves, which
further outsource to private parties (e.g., industry groups and consulting
firms) as well as suppliers who are regulating the tiers below them. This
chain of outsourcing leaves the state several layers removed from decision-
making and the regulatory process. As a result, the private parties responsi-
ble for implementing regulation lack direct government oversight and their
activities are less transparent to the public. In addition, firms may lack the
resources and expertise to locate and regulate their suppliers. Therefore,
home states need to become more involved in efforts to promote supply
chain transparency.
In the case of section 1502, state agencies—the SEC, U.S. State Depart-
ment, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. De-
partment of Commerce—are taking on an active role on some issues but
need more involvement on many others. Below, this Article analyzes the
activities currently undertaken by agencies and the areas where they need to
take on more responsibility. While the SEC was initially slow to finalize the
rule implementing section 1502, in 2013 and 2014 it issued limited inter-
pretive guidance in the form of twenty-one frequently asked questions.191
The slow trickle of guidance from the SEC is understandable given the
191. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Frequently Asked Questions: Conflict
Minerals, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm. (Apr. 7, 2014, May 30, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/guidance/conflictminerals-faq.htm#q13.
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heavy rule-making workload following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
rigorous economic analysis and public consultation involved in drafting the
rule, and the years of litigation over its adoption.192 Yet it has left compa-
nies in a bind over how to comply with the new costly requirements. This
will be a pressing issue once the grace period ends in two to four years,
leaving companies unable to waive certain requirements.
The State Department and USAID have actively supported the responsi-
ble sourcing of conflict minerals, but more work still needs to be done.
Section 1502 requires the two agencies to develop a strategy to “address the
linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups, mining of conflict
minerals and commercial products.”193 It mandates that the State Depart-
ment develop a map of mineral-rich areas under control of armed groups in
the DRC.194 The Dodd-Frank Act further requires that the map be updated
every 180 days.195 USAID and the State Department have complied with
these two provisions, having submitted a strategy in 2011 and several up-
dated maps (most recently in February 2014).196 The strategy lists five
objectives that the agencies aimed to fulfill over the coming years: “(1) pro-
mote an appropriate role of security forces, (2) enhance civilian regulation of
minerals trade in the DRC, (3) protect artisanal miners and local communi-
ties, (4) strengthen regional and international efforts, and (5) promote due
diligence and responsible trade through public outreach.”197
The two agencies have made praiseworthy efforts toward achieving these
goals, devoting over $25 million as of 2013 and engaging in various stake-
holder partnerships and outreach.198 Notable activities by USAID include
partnership with the International Organization for Migration to undertake
infrastructure improvements and institutional reforms to help enhance civil-
ian control of the DRC’s mineral trade.199 The agency is also providing tech-
nical assistance to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
(ICGLR), particularly in support of mineral audit mechanisms.200 The State
Department has facilitated outreach efforts for industry associations such as
CFSI and has reached out to foreign governments and companies to support
the aim of the legislation.201 In addition, the U.S. Special Envoy for the
Great Lakes Region has worked with multilateral and bilateral partners to
strengthen international coordination mechanisms on the crisis in the
region.202
192. See supra section II.A.
193. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(c)(1)(A).
194. Id. at § 1502(c)(2)(A).
195. Id. at § 1502(c)(2)(C).
196. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 179, at 13, 14.
197. Id. at 14.
198. Id. at 19.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 21.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id.
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Yet these activities are just the tip of the iceberg of what the State De-
partment and USAID should be supporting. It is critical to devote more
substantial resources to governments and local capacity-building initiatives,
particularly the ICGLR, which is responsible for implementing the OECD
Due Diligence Guidance in the region.203 Further support is needed to en-
sure that the ICGLR’s regional certification system is robust and that mem-
ber states incorporate the OECD Guidance into their respective legislative
frameworks. Local governments support the ICGLR mechanism because it is
locally governed while also responding to international or U.S.-based legal
requirements.204 Yet according to a consultant to the ICGLR, implementa-
tion by regional governments is currently weak because of minimal coordi-
nation between the ICGLR and national coordinators and the difficulties of
translating and interpreting legal texts to agents on the ground.205 The State
Department and USAID need to invest in the capacity of local government
agents to implement the certification system mechanism. Such an invest-
ment is mandated under section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which re-
quires the agencies to support local government efforts to “develop stronger
governance and economic institutions that can facilitate and improve trans-
parency in the cross-border trade involving the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to reduce exploitation by armed groups
and promote local and regional development.”206
In addition to providing extra funding to the ICGLR, U.S. agencies
should help develop in-region sourcing initiatives and coordinate certifica-
tion standards, offer support for companies in mapping their supply chains,
and promote international convergence of regulatory standards on supply
chain transparency. The State Department and USAID currently coordinate
with other stakeholders through the Public-Private Alliance for Responsible
Minerals Trade (PPA), which consists of participants from foreign govern-
ments, industry, and civil society.207 In 2011, the agencies pledged to invest
approximately $3.2 million in the PPA to fund organizations working on
responsible sourcing efforts.208 Agencies should increase funding to PPA and
coordinate the many initiatives that are at times competing in the region.
203. Established in 2006, the ICGLR is a relatively new organization with an aim to create the
conditions for security, stability, and development between its eleven member states. With the introduc-
tion of conflict minerals legislation in the United States and the adoption of the OECD Due Diligence
Guidance, the organization began working with Partnership Africa Canada in 2010 to develop its Re-
gional Certification Mechanism. See Partnership Africa Canada, ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism
for Conflict Minerals, available at http://www.pacweb.org/en/regional-certification.
204. Interview with Joanne Lebert, Director, Great Lakes Programme, Partnership Africa Canada
(July 31, 2013).
205. Interview with Markus Weilenmann, Consultant to the International Conference of the Great
Lakes Region (July 15, 2013).
206. Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(c)(1)(B).
207. See Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade: Overview, RESOLVE, available at
http://www.resolv.org/site-ppa/files/2011/09/PPA-Overview-04-30-14.pdf.
208. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: Public-Private Alliance for Responsible
Minerals Trade (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177214.htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI202.txt unknown Seq: 39 21-AUG-15 12:04
2015 / Shining Light on Global Supply Chains 457
The United States also needs to exert its leverage to call for harmonization of
existing certification standards given its central role in passing the first con-
flict minerals legislation.
While the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative has proven effective in certi-
fying about one-fifth of smelters and refiners, only CFSI members have ac-
cess to information about the SEC-required “reasonable country of origin”
data for conflict minerals.209 It is important that companies that cannot af-
ford membership have access to this valuable information, which would as-
sist their compliance with due diligence requirements. Therefore, U.S.
agencies, perhaps through PPA, should sponsor collection and publication of
the information to all companies. In addition, companies are in need of a
comprehensive list of smelters worldwide.210 According to the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office, the Commerce Department failed to meet its
mandate to report a list of all known conflict minerals processing facilities to
appropriate congressional committees annually starting in January 2013.211
This list, which was finally submitted to Congress on September 5, 2014,
facilitates in-region sourcing initiatives as well as companies seeking to
identify smelters for their supply chain due diligence.212
Finally, in order to facilitate responsible trade in minerals worldwide, the
SEC and State Department need to promote convergence of regulatory stan-
dards for transparent supply chains. Following the recent global financial
crisis, there have been calls to facilitate cross-border cooperation through the
setting of common rules and standards, information sharing, and collabora-
tion on supervision.213 While international convergence may not be appro-
priate for all regulations, it is essential for those that require global
coordination—such as laws seeking to prevent human rights violations in
corporate supply chains. It is also important in order to prevent companies
from moving their business to unregulated regions. Since section 1502 only
applies to companies listed in the United States and only concerns conflict
minerals in the DRC region, there is a fear that it may create a de-facto
embargo in Africa. According to Terry Heymann of the World Gold
Council:
The requirement to identify whether [gold] comes from central
Africa, and the fact that if the metal does not come from central
209. See Benefits of Membership in the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative, Conflict-Free Sourcing Initia-
tive, http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/membership/ (last visited March 28, 2015).
210. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 179, at 18.
211. Id. at 16–17.
212. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Department of Commerce Reporting Requirements Under Section
1502(D)(3)(C) of the Dodd-Frank Act World-Wide Conflict Mineral Processing Facilities, http://
www.ita.doc.gov/td/forestprod/DOC-ConflictMineralReport.pdf; Emily Chasan, “Conflict Minerals” Too
Hard to Track, Commerce Department Says, Wall St. Journal Blog (Sept. 5, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/
cfo/2014/09/05/conflict-minerals-too-hard-to-track-commerce-department-says/.
213. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 743, 746
(2010).
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Africa, it minimizes reporting requirements, certainly has caused
us to be concerned that it could lead to a stigmatization of gold
from the African Great Lakes Region, or indeed, gold from [any-
where in] Africa.214
International convergence would relieve company concerns over a potential
loss of competitive advantage from doing business in regulated regions.
B. Improving Corporate Compliance
While home states must take greater responsibility for implementation of
supply chain regulations, companies must recognize that they face a major
compliance challenge that requires new tools and sustained investment in
their internal culture. Given that global supply chains frequently include
multiple layers of suppliers that are difficult to trace and audit, companies
face “one of the most complex compliance projects we’ve ever seen,” accord-
ing to a partner and leader of sustainability services at Ernst & Young.215
Compliance will become especially challenging once an independent private
sector audit is required, which for most companies will commence with the
2015 compliance period. Over the next two years, it will be essential for
firms to create a culture of compliance featuring cooperation among multi-
ple departments. As part of this culture, they must enforce new relations
with suppliers that will foster organizational learning around supply chain
management.
The low due diligence rate for section 1502 described earlier in this Arti-
cle reveals the need for firms to invest in their corporate culture. Companies
should not treat responsible supply chain management as exclusively a legal
compliance issue, which would be expected given the “organizational inter-
nalization of law” within firms.216 Rather, compliance teams around such
issues as conflict minerals should include a range of expertise from multiple
areas, including legal, finance, procurement, engineering, internal audit, and
information technology. In addition, investor relations and communications
should be involved given that sustainable supply chain management is rele-
vant to many institutional and socially responsible investors and can pose a
reputational risk if handled inadequately. In the words of Michael Lit-
tenberg, a leading legal expert on conflict minerals, the need for cooperation
by various departments “makes it different than most other compliance
projects at most companies because you have so many more different people
that have to touch this and have to be involved in it for it to work—more so
214. Interview with Terry Heymann, Managing Director, Gold for Development and Market Intelli-
gence, World Gold Council (July 24, 2013).
215. Ken Tysiac, Build a Strong Team To Comply with Conflict Minerals Rule, J. of Accountancy (Dec.
12, 2012), available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/News/20126875.htm.
216. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the Haves Hold Court: Speculations of the Organi-
zational Internalization of Law, 33 Law & Soc’y Rev. 941 (1999).
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than with a lot of other compliance work.”217 Multi-disciplinary teams also
need to be empowered with resources and decision-making authority, and
receive buy-in from senior levels of management. Finally, changing corpo-
rate culture will involve enforcing supply chain policies, providing training
to employees, and designing appropriate incentives for them to cooperate,
which is particularly important given that employees are responsible for in-
teracting with suppliers and flagging any wrongdoing.
The management of suppliers is a crucial component of creating a culture
of compliance around responsible supply chain regulation. Due diligence
requires a number of steps that companies must undertake, including adopt-
ing a robust policy for suppliers; revising standard form contracts to require
compliance with supply chain policies, supplier disclosure obligations, and a
company’s right to conduct inspections of the supplier’s operations; and de-
veloping procedures for suspending or terminating suppliers that do not
comply with a firm’s sourcing policies.218 Technology can be used to collect
data on suppliers, identify red flags in their activities, and restrict procure-
ment to suppliers that comply with corporate supply chain policies. Ideally,
companies would not outsource due diligence steps to consulting firms.
Rather, companies should undergo the process themselves and thereby facili-
tate organizational learning. For example, Intel developed its own system for
bagging, tagging, and verifying minerals—a process that took nearly five
years given the complexity and expanse of the company’s supply chain.219
What differentiates companies such as Intel that exhibit strong due dili-
gence under section 1502 from those that disclose weak due diligence is the
sustained relationship they have with their suppliers.220 These companies do
not only send surveys out to their suppliers; they also undergo on-site vali-
dation processes and work directly with suppliers to encourage their partici-
pation in third-party audit programs.221
Intel’s commitment to only produce conflict-free processors is an example
of how companies can potentially turn compliance into a competitive advan-
tage. While supply chain transparency laws pose a unique compliance chal-
lenge for firms, there are important benefits to companies that have been
overlooked. For instance, compliance mitigates potential risks and enhances
a company’s reputation among such stakeholders as consumers, investors,
and NGOs. Moreover, in the process of complying with these laws and con-
ducting due diligence, companies can find possible inefficiencies within
217. Interview with Michael R. Littenberg, Partner, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (Aug. 22, 2014).
218. See Michael Littenberg, Farzad Damania, & Joseph Valane, Practice Note: Preparing for Conflict
Minerals Rule Compliance: Company Action Items Checklist, Practical Law Company (Apr. 14, 2014).
219. See Ian King, Intel Stiff-Armed Pursuing African-Mine Conflict Minerals, Bloomberg Bus. (May
26, 2014), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-27/intel-endures-resistance-starving-
africa-s-militia-mines.html.
220. Id.
221. See Intel, Intel’s Efforts to Achieve a “Conflict-Free” Supply Chain (May 2014),
available at http://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/policy/policy-conflict-minerals.pdf.
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their supply chain and thereby improve their supply chain management so
as to effectively reduce costs. Law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (SRZ)
reports the experience of several clients:
In 2013, some companies used [section 1502] as a catalyst for
assembling for the first time a centralized database of vendor com-
pliance personnel, enabling them to more efficiently disseminate
compliance communications and track vendor responses. At some
companies with a decentralized procurement function, the data
gathered in connection with the Rule is being used to identify
common vendors and opportunities for volume pricing and ven-
dor consolidation, as well as pricing discrepancies among business
units.222
Companies should see supply chain transparency as an opportunity to not
only be better global citizens, but to also make their operational systems
more effective by accessing useful information about their respective supply
chains. As Michael Littenberg, a partner at SRZ, observes:
It may be nothing specifically to do with sourcing from the DRC
countries, but you learn a lot more about the source [of all of your
components]. You are able to do it more efficiently and this be-
comes something that not only pays for itself but maybe that
saves you money at the end of the day.223
Rather than focusing on the immediate costs of complying with supply
chain laws, companies should recognize potential long-term benefits such as
efficient business processes and enhanced reputation.
Conclusion
This Article analyzes the effectiveness of using domestic law to promote
global supply chain transparency based on a case study of conflict minerals
legislation in the United States. Its empirical analysis of section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act reveals a due diligence gap among companies that submit-
ted Conflict Minerals Reports. It identifies three factors that are hindering
compliance: (i) international norms on supply chain due diligence are in
their infancy; (ii) there is a proliferation of certification standards and in-
region sourcing initiatives that are still evolving and sometimes competing;
and (iii) inadequate local security and weak governance are inhibiting the
222. Michael Littenberg & Farzad Damania, Conflict Minerals Compliance: Observations and Recommenda-
tions for 2014 and Beyond, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (2014) available at http://www.srz.com/files/News/
954d4932-90f0-469f-84e7-f09560d6d102/Presentation/NewsAttachment/4c806e74-b22a-4b93-8da0-f
2395daba908/SRZ_Conflict_Minerals_Compliance_Observations_and_Recommendations_for_2014_
and_Beyond.pdf.
223. Interview with Michael R. Littenberg, supra note 217.
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mapping of the mineral trade and the tracing of minerals in the region. In
order to improve corporate compliance, home countries need to play a larger
role in implementation by investing in local capacity-building, coordinating
in-region sourcing initiatives and certification standards, and supporting
companies still struggling with compliance. In addition, companies need to
invest in a culture of compliance led by an interdisciplinary team of employ-
ees from multiple departments and featuring organizational learning around
supply chain management.
The early implementation of section 1502 provides lessons for other coun-
tries and regional bodies such as the EU that are drafting similar legislation
that extraterritorially regulates supply chains. While section 1502 applies to
the use of conflict minerals from certain African countries, future regulation
may cover broader geographies and additional commodities. Therefore, com-
panies should implement a flexible compliance program that can accommo-
date emerging legislation on supply chains. In addition, firms may need to
scale their operations to efficiently meet new responsible sourcing require-
ments and shifting markets for their products, given evolving consumer and
investor demand for disclosure and ethical purchasing.
Just as companies should take a multi-disciplinary approach to compli-
ance involving various departments, scholars need to study the intersection
of global supply chains with various areas of law. We need more theoretical
and empirical work on the implications of outsourcing on a variety of fields
including contract law, intellectual property law, human rights law, and
international law. Given the centrality of outsourcing in the world political
economy, this Article aims to stimulate further legal scholarship in this in-
creasingly relevant area.
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Appendix
Definitions of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
OECDComply: The dependent variable. This is the total score given to a
particular Conflict Mineral Report (CMR), where total score is given a value
between 0–5, and is calculated by summing the presence of five factors that
correspond to strong due diligence under the OECD due diligence frame-
work. Each factor is based on a dummy variable that is described in the
main text.
Ad_Sales: This is the ratio of advertising expenditures to net sales for fiscal
year 2012.  Data taken from Compustat.
Log_assets: This is the natural log of total balance sheet assets in fiscal year
2012.  Data taken from Compustat.
ROA: This is return on assets, which is the ratio of net income to total assets
in fiscal year 2012.  Data taken from Compustat.
Liquidity: This is the ratio of cash to total balance sheet assets in fiscal year
2012. Data taken from Compustat.
CFSI: This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CMR referenced the
Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI), Conflict-Free Smelter Program
(CFSP), or any variation on the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative.
CalTSCA: This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the issuer is listed
on the website “www.knowthechain.org” as being in compliance with the
public disclosure requirements of the California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act.
OtherRef_1: This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the CMR
makes one reference to exactly one of the following initiatives: 1) The Re-
sponsible Jewelry Council Chain-of-Custody Certification Program; 2) the
International Tin Supply Chain Initiative; 3) the London Bullion Market
Association Responsible Gold Program; 4) Solutions for Hope; 5) the
Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade; 6) the Tungsten
Conflict Mineral Council; 7) the Conflict-Free Tin Initiative.
OtherRef_2plus: This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the CMR
makes reference to two or more of the seven initiatives given in OtherRef_1.
Industry Controls: These are dummy variables based on the firm’s primary SIC
industry as reported in Compustat.  The dummy variables are based on the
following sector groupings: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Mining, and
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Construction (SIC 1-19); process manufacturing (SIC 26, 28, and 29); other
nondurable manufacturing (SIC 20-23 and 27); high-technology manufac-
turing (SIC 36-38 and 3571); other durable manufacturing (SIC 24-25, 30-
35 excluding 3571, and 39); transportation (40-47); utilities (48-49);
wholesale and retail trade (50-59); finance (60-67); other services (70-89).
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